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The
IRA has been accused of causing a stalemate in Northern
Ireland - not by planting a bomb or shooting a soldier,
but by failing to clarify the wording of a recent
statement. It used to be political and military stand-offs
over big issues that caused crises in Northern Ireland.
Now it seems that words and phrases are enough to
bring the state to a standstill.
On
13 April, in response to pressure from the British
and Irish governments, the IRA issued a statement
on its commitment to the peace process. The aim was
to get Northern Ireland moving again, following the
suspension of the devolved assembly in October 2002
amid allegations of an IRA spy ring at the heart of
Stormont. Although the IRA statement made clear its
full commitment to peaceful means and its desire to
'see the [peace process] succeed', British and Irish
officials were unimpressed with the wording and called
for clarification (1).
For
the British, the problem with the statement was that,
while it 'represented progress', it didn't contain
the words 'the war is over' (2). So on 15 April, the
IRA offered clarification, in a private note sent
to the British and Irish governments - but according
to a British spokesman, there remained outstanding
issues in relation to the wording. Consequently, British
and Irish officials have held back from publishing
a joint blueprint on Northern Ireland's future.
Now,
Sinn Fein president Gerry Adams has made a statement
aimed at clarifying the IRA statement. 'The IRA statement
is a statement of completely peaceful intent', says
Adams. 'Its logic is that there should be no activities
inconsistent with this.' But….British and Unionist
officials think the word 'should' in Adams' statement
should have been 'will', which would have turned the
promise that IRA actions 'should not happen' into
'will not happen'. As BBC News reports, 'There now
seems to be just one word standing between republicans
and the British….' (3).
According
to one report, this toing and froing over the IRA's
wording has left Northern Ireland 'hanging in the
balance' (4). Some British officials apparently want
to cancel the assembly elections, due to take place
at the end of May, until the deadlock over the statement
has been resolved.
What's
going on? How can, in the words of one Irish paper,
'the elusive prize of permanent peace and stability…hang
on a single word'? The clarification crisis over the
IRA statement is a logical conclusion of the peace
process - a process that is less about resolving Northern
Ireland's political questions than containing them,
less about finding a political solution than 'accommodating
difference'. In the depoliticised New Northern Ireland,
symbolic gesture is all, and watching your language
has taken the place of political debate.
Any
serious observer of Northern Irish affairs knows that
the IRA's 'war is over'. After 25 years of fighting
against the British presence in Ireland, the IRA declared
a 'a complete cessation of military operations' in
August 1994.
It
broke its ceasefire in February 1996, with a massive
bomb attack on Canary Wharf in London. But even the
shortlived bombing campaign that followed looked less
a re-declaration of war than an expression of frustration
with the pace of the peace process. During its resumption
of violence, the IRA said it remained committed to
finding 'an inclusive negotiated settlement' (5).
The breaking of the ceasefire was a military attempt
to offset the perceived humiliation brought about
by some of the republican movement's sweeping political
concessions, rather than a new war to get 'Brits out'.
The resumed campaign fizzled into a second ceasefire
in July 1997.
Many
point to the fact that the IRA still carries out punishment
beatings in nationalist areas of Northern Ireland
as evidence that it is still a threat. Yet the IRA's
transformation into a local policing outfit shows
that, as a guerrilla army that threatens war, it is
a spent force. It is common in post-conflict situations
for armed groups to turn inwards. In the absence of
the broader political and military objectives that
defined the conflict, they often end up policing their
own.
Over
and above the IRA's sporadic military forays since
1994, the Irish republican movement no longer fundamentally
objects to British interference in Ireland. Sinn Fein
and the IRA once claimed to be the 'legitimate government'
of Ireland, the true heirs of the 1916 declaration
of an Irish Republic, whose aim was to get British
forces out of the Six Counties. Now republicans effectively
accept their position as just another political party
representing Northern Ireland's Catholic minority
in the peace process. Far from going back to war to
get Britain out of Ireland, republicans now demand
more British engagement, calling on the British government
to 'face up to its responsibilities' in finding a
solution in Ireland (6).
If
everything points to the IRA's war being over, why
has Northern Ireland come to a standstill over the
IRA's failure to declare that its war is over? This
is the peace process in action, where words and presentation
take precedence over conviction and action. Having
transformed Northern Ireland's conflict from a political
one over sovereignty into a cultural squabble over
respect for identities, the peace process has put
the symbolic centre stage. Or, as a BBC reporter put
it, in contrast to the modern mantra 'content is king',
in Northern Ireland's peace process 'clarity is king'
(7).
And
as recent events show, depoliticising the conflict
has not led to a new era of peace and cooperation.
Rather, the institutionalisation of difference and
identity threatens to heighten tensions and increase
the potential for endless squabbling.
The
aim of the peace process was never to find the definitive
solution to the Irish conflict. Indeed, it is founded
on the idea that there is no definitive solution.
It is now accepted across the board that the real
problem in Northern Ireland is the existence of two
distinct identities - nationalism and Unionism - both
of which are 'worthy of respect', but which have been
unable to live peacefully side-by-side.
According
to the perceived wisdom, the reason nationalism and
Unionism failed to co-exist was that each sought a
'one-identity', winner-takes-all solution. The nationalists
wanted a united Ireland in which the Unionist identity
would be lost, while the Unionists wanted to continue
dominating their Six-County statelet, which had proved
so disastrous for nationalists.
The
peace process rewrote the 25-year conflict in Northern
Ireland. What was in truth a national struggle between
the Irish Republican Army and British and Unionist
forces - between those who sought an independent united
Ireland and those who wanted to keep British dominion
over the North - is now talked about as if it were
an inter-communal conflict, between two identities
that didn't get on. When Northern Ireland's problems
are viewed in this way, the role of the peace process
becomes, not opting for one of those nasty old-fashioned
solutions, but managing relations between the distinct
identities.
This
is why it is a peace process, because it is a permanent
thing, an ongoing process of keeping and managing
the peace. The peace process is not about moving towards
a definable endpoint, but about making sure that each
side's voice is heard and respected at all times.
All
the declarations and institutions of the peace process
have emphasised moving away from 'solutions' towards
'inclusivist agendas' in which both traditions are
'accommodated'. The partition treaty of 1921 redrew
the map of Ireland and imposed, for good or ill, what
the then British government considered to be a solution
to the historic conflict between Irish nationalism
and British imperialism. By contrast, today's peace
process has only given rise to declarations, frameworks
and assemblies, in which solution-talk is actively
frowned upon.
The
original document of the peace process was the 1993
Downing Street declaration, issued by then British
prime minister John Major and then Irish prime minister
Albert Reynolds. Its main proposal was to 'embrace
the two traditions'. The Framework Document of 1995
did what its title suggested - proposing a framework
for managing conflict rather than a solution for bringing
conflict to an end and kickstarting a new politics.
Even
the assembly initiated by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement
was not about bringing the peace process to a conclusion
and getting on with normal politics. Instead of being
a traditional parliamentary chamber where political
issues are resolved, the assembly has largely been
a glorified talking shop. Everyone elected to the
assembly must declare whether they are 'nationalist,
Unionist or other', so that the assembly can continue
the job of respecting both identities. And one of
its main aims is to reach 'sufficiency of consensus'
on every issue, to show that both traditions in Northern
Ireland (and all the other little ones) agree on every
course of action.
The
proceedings at the assembly are not treaty negotiations
or even political debates, but 'all-party talks'.
The role of the assembly is simply to get the two
identities talking - endlessly. It is the act of talking
that is seen as important, rather than the question
of what the talking might lead to.
It
is in this climate that something like the wording
of an IRA statement can assume such headline-grabbing
importance. The peace process has emptied Northern
Ireland's clash of its political content, making it
into a clash of identities that has to be managed
forever. And with this emphasis on reassuring both
traditions of their worth, the peace process makes
gestures into the substance of political life. All
sides have constantly to reaffirm their commitment
to the peace process and their respect for the other
identity, and the more publicly and clearly they do
that, the better.
That
is why we have the spectacle of British officials
spending two weeks trying to get the IRA to reword
and clarify a statement - in order to, as British
officials put it, 'reassure Unionists'. During the
Troubles, the IRA issued statements to take responsibility
for and to justify political and military actions.
Now the statements themselves are seen as being the
stuff of politics, the apparent driving force to 'move
things along'.
Where
do the people of Northern Ireland stand in relation
to all this? Recent events confirm that the nationalist
and Unionist communities have been disenfranchised
from political life, left outside while the political
parties get on with the process of peace. According
to Irish Times writer Suzanne Breen: 'Everyone up
here is disillusioned. Even the staunchest supporters
of the Belfast Agreement have grown weary of the endless
cycle of crises and crux negotiations…. In pubs,
taxi depots, and cafes, in-depth analysis focuses
on the race for the English Premiership, not that
for the peace deal. The strategies of Sir Alex Ferguson
and Arsene Wenger arouse much more interest than those
of Gerry Adams and David Trimble.' (8)
Just
15 years ago, people in Northern Ireland were more
politically motivated and organised than anywhere
else in the United Kingdom or Ireland. Nationalists
and Unionists were involved in mass movements, whether
dedicated to highlighting British repression in Ireland
or to defending the Union with Britain. Now, the people
ponder football while their leaders ponder peace.
And who can blame them? The Premiership is infinitely
more interesting than the ins and outs of the peace
process.
The
peace process is deeply undemocratic. With the rarefied
emphasis on rising above old-fashioned political squabbles,
the politicians and officials driving the process
view the people of Northern Ireland suspiciously.
Some believe that the people's base instincts could
even throw the peace process off course. Officials
worry that if Northern Ireland's politicians, currently
being weaned off their desires for a single-identity
solution, are allowed too much contact with the people,
it might re-ignite their old political posturings,
where they will attempt to win votes by appealing
to the masses' presumed desires for old-fashioned
solutions.
That
is why some are proposing that the assembly elections
be cancelled until the controversy over the IRA's
statement has been sorted. After all, how can politicians
go to the people when there is an issue that remains
unresolved, open and up for question? In the peace
process, the role of the people is to rubber-stamp
developments, not to debate them and make decisions.
Amid
the peace process's war of words over nothing, politics
and democracy are being killed off.
(1)
IRA
statement unclear, Sky News, 14 April 2003
(2)
IRA
statement unclear, Sky News, 14 April 2003
(3)
Adams
move 'muddies the waters', BBC News, 28 April
2003
(4)
IRA
told to clarify crucial statement, Reuters,
14 April 2003
(5)
Irish
Republican Army Statement Ending Ceasefire,
9 February 1996
(6)
See Sinn
Fein shine spotlight on Human Rights and Equality
during the course of the negotiations, Sinn
Fein press release, 28 February 2003
(7)
Adams
move 'muddies the waters', BBC News, 28 April
2003
(8)
Indifference
to peace process on the streets, Suzanne Breen,
Irish Times, 25 April 2003
This
article was first published in Spiked
Online and is carried here with permission from
the author.
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