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There
is general consensus on what the ultimate aim of Irish
Republicanism is: the establishment of a sovereign
32 county socialist Republic based on the 1916 Proclamation.
However, where there is little agreement as to how
this aim is going to be achieved. The 'Provisional'
movement argues that the 1998 'Good Friday Agreement'
is the way forward, that it represents the best opportunity
to achieve the goals of Irish Republicanism. Republicans
of the so-called 'dissident' variety are opposed to
this view. They argue that the benefits of the Good
Friday Agreement like power sharing and cross border
bodies, far from being some 'stepping stone' towards
the achievement of the Republic are in fact nothing
other than part of the British state's alternative
to Republicanism since 1973. If the Good Friday Agreement
is to be rejected, what are the alternatives? When
thinking of an “alternative”, I have in
mind the kind of strategy which would facilitate the
apparition of conditions most opportune to the realisation
of the Republican objectives.
Republicans
have to build an alternative based on a realistic
assessment. The existing balance of forces is heavily
weighted against Republicans. They have to face the
British state, the Irish state, the SDLP, pro and
anti GFA faction of Unionism, Sinn Fein, social democracy,
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael. All have vested interests
in the preservation of the status quo. At the present
moment they face tolerable discontent. The people
still have the benefits of the Celtic Tiger and the
Good Friday Agreement in mind. The conclusions that
can be drawn from this is that if Republicans want
to challenge all those adversaries, change the balance
of forces they will have to identify their weakest
point, where they are most vulnerable. One does not
attack an adversary where or when they are in a position
of strength, but where the adversary is most vulnerable.
For example, until a decade ago, the weakest point
of the 26 counties was probably emigration and mass
unemployment. Those two factors clearly pointed how
much a failed entity the Free state was, they called
for radical change. The North's weakest point was
that it was irreformable, that after decades of failed
reforms and political initiatives, Catholics were
still treated as second class citizens and Protestant
communities were still in the grips of biggots.
Apart
from the unfavorable balance of forces, late 2003
is not the best moment for Republican politics to
grow. The success of the Celtic Tiger and enthousiasm
for the Good Friday Agreement are withering away,
but have not yet matured to the point that both the
26 counties and the 6 counties are in a state of structural
crisis or facing significant legitimacy crisis. Effective
Republican politics have to challenge adversaries
not just where they are at their weakest point, but
when the moment is most opportune. The point is to
wait for the right moment, and to prepare for this
moment. Periods of crisis provide the best conjuncture
for a political intervention. For example, 1972 or
1981 provided more political opportunities than let's
say 1963 or 1991. The hard fact is that the achievement
of Republican objectives is not always and everywhere
possible. Socialism or Free Ireland are not just round
the corner. Republicans have to patiently prepare
themselves politically and organisationally so that
they will be ready to seize the opportunity, seize
the moment. They need to know not just what weakens
the enemy, but what can strengthen the forces of Republicanism
and their project. Republicans need to cultivate political
virtues, such as the ability to give political leadership
and strategic initiative. The aim of all Republican
actions and interventions should be to have maximum
political impact and effect.
To
be successful, Republicans will need to mobilise a
vast amount of people, tens or perhaps hundreds of
thousands of them. Where are they going to find them?
They should look to all those potentially or actually
involved in struggles, be they economic (conditions
of work, wages...), social (the rights of women, youth,
racism...), political (national question, corruption,
neutrality...) or ideological (influence of religion,
revisionism...). From Bin Tax protestors in Dublin
to the prisoners in Maghaberry, from protestors outside
Shannon air base to the youth of Ardoyne, there are
a vast amount of social forces involved in struggles
that could be mobilised. The task of Republicans is
to push those struggles to the limit, that their combined
effect aggravates the crisis of the status quo. To
enable this, Republicans should develop a programme
around which the people can be mobilised.
These
are general strategic considerations, but what about
some practical suggestions? A starting point could
be that in the North, the weakest point is sectarianism
and neo-liberalism. The Good Friday Agreement was
supposed to diminish sectarianism, but it has in fact
contributed to its dramatic increase. Arguing for
'parity of esteem' or 'equality' can sometimes end
up being just a reversed version of sectarianism.
Politics in the North are often limited to competition
between two sectarian blocks over scarce resources.
The Republican alternative is to displace this into
a confrontation between the Irish people and the British
state. For example, Republicans should seek to displace
the struggle over policing from one of being 'representative
of nationalists' ("Implement Patten!") to
one about the colonial and capitalist nature of the
police force ("Disband the RUC!"). The other
weakness is that from Sinn Fein to the DUP, there
is consensus that cuts have to be made in public,
health and education sectors, and private finance
initiatives have to be introduced. This is going to
affect people badly, particularly the most socially
and economically disadvantaged. The Republican alternative
is to confront the pro-business agenda of Orange and
Green parties and organise resistance to its implementation.
In the South, as the Celtic Tiger is slowly entering
crisis, Republicans could capitalise on social discontent
(issues ranging from crime to unemployment), and on
the current crisis of confidence in the establishment
(corruption, tribunals, etc). The concrete effects
of the national question (i. e. emergency laws, supergrasses,
etc) constitute the other main area for intervention.
For the Republican struggle to succeed, North and
South, the cause of Ireland and the cause of labour
have to be organically united.
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