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How
different are social stereotypes in Northern Ireland
from those existing elsewhere? Are there social stereotypes
specific to Northern Ireland? What differentiates
social stereotypes in Northern Ireland from other
places is their sectarian nature: there are stereotypes
for Catholics and Protestants, Nationalists and Unionists,
Republicans and Loyalists. In Northern Ireland people
are being categorised according to their ethno-national
group and are made to fit into some sectarian stereotype.
This is not just in Northern Ireland, when people
from Belfast are abroad, generally the first thing
that they are being asked is whether they are Catholic
or Protestant. Sectarian stereotypes are of course
not the only kind of social stereotypes that exist
in Northern Ireland, but they are the dominant categories
of the two communities’ social consciousness
and total ideologies. In his book “The Politics
of Legitimacy” (1976) the anthropologist
Frank Burton was the first to show how sectarian stereotypes
were a form of ideological social relations of pervasive
importance in daily life in Northern Ireland. It is
a practical and necessary social skill to be able
to “tell the difference” between Protestants
and Catholics if the problems endemic to a sectarian
social milieu are to be avoided. Telling the difference
is based on the social significance attached to name,
area of residence, school attended etc. These elements
provide the material for fashioning in an ongoing
and narrative manner the theories and stereotypes
which each side has of the other.
As ideological representations, stereotypes are based
on a mixture of myth and reality. In order to understand
sectarian stereotypes, it is necessary to understand
their material roots in society. To do otherwise is
to fatally underestimate their strength and durability.
Sectarianism is a material reality, it is totally
mistaken to understand it as being a matter of individual
ideas and prejudices. Sectarian stereotypes reveal
the materiality of sectarian divisions at all levels
in Northern Ireland. Segregated housing, occupational
and unemployment distribution, voting alignments,
schools, friendship networks and inter marriage rates
all testify to the importance of the divisions. Sectarian
stereotypes and ideas do not produce a sectarian organisation
of society, rather sectarian social realities produce
sectarian ideas and stereotypes. People have sectarian
stereotypes because they grew up and live in a society
which is sectarian in nature. Sectarian stereotypes
are ideological constructions which serve to order
the experiences of a sectarian social division, they
are the “conceptual and cognitive ghetto of Northern
Irish ideological social relations” (Frank Burton).
They constitute a structuring which reflects the reality
of this fundamental social division. Sectarian stereotypes
are not just ideas in the head of individuals, they
do not “fall from heaven” miraculously,
they have an objective basis in reality. This is why
all those “peace and reconciliation” programmes
are profoundly idealist and conservative in nature,
because they are based upon the axiom that it is a
matter of “educating”, of removing individual
prejudices and stereotypes rather than change sectarian
realities. Change your ideas, then reality will change
rather than transform reality and then your ideas
about it will change.
Apart
from their material roots, the main reason for the
persistence of sectarian stereotypes has been their
effective political and legal institutionalisation.
One of the effects of the peace process is that it
has effectively transformed the Northern Ireland conflict
from a political one over national sovereignty into
a cultural squabble over respect for “identities”
(Brendan O Neill). Central to the peace process is
the idea that Northern Ireland has two distinct communities
whose culture and interests are different and who
must be constantly policed and kept apart. Far from
providing a basis for ending sectarianism, the 1998
Agreement has enshrined sectarian stereotypes in the
new political structures it introduced. For example,
the now suspended Northern Ireland Assembly institutionalises
sectarianism, by demanding that "at their first
meeting, members of the Assembly will register a designation
of identity - nationalist, Unionist or other - for
the purpose of measuring cross-community support in
assembly votes" - effectively freezing different
identities in law. Those refusing to define themselves
in sectarian terms are effectively sidelined, since
all key decisions require a majority within both camps.
The peace process is not about resolving the conflict
but about "celebrating cultural diversity"
- not about overcoming the divisions between Catholics
and Protestants but about recognising those "cultural
differences" and respecting them. By the institutionalisation
of "cultural difference" and “identities”,
the peace process has reinforced existing sectarian
stereotypes. Sectarianism has become the semi-official
mechanism through which the different communities
are forced to compete for ever-dwindling resources.
The
consequences have been bleak. A report issued in 2002
by the Royal Geographical Society found that sectarian
divisions have worsened since the peace process began
in Northern Ireland. Prompted in part by the Northern
Ireland Office’s denials that sectarianism was
on the increase, Dr Peter Shirlow of the University
of Ulster interviewed 4,800 people in 12 Belfast estates,
6 Catholic and six Protestant. The results are damning.
Believing the hype about the peace process many, mostly
Catholics, moved house to areas not dominated by their
own religious denomination. The Housing Executive
report that three thousand moved between 1994 and
1996 but sectarian intimidation forced a reverse movement
of 6,000 in the following five years. Two-thirds of
the population now live in areas which are either
90% Catholic or 90% Protestant. In predominantly Protestant
areas companies have a Catholic workforce of only
5% while in Catholic areas only 8% of the workforce
is Protestant. Only one in five people would take
a job on the other side of the peace line. 62% in
areas separated by a peace line think community relations
have got worse. 68% of young people between the ages
of 18 and 25 claim never to have had a meaningful
conversation with someone from the other religious
denomination and 62% say they have been the victim
of physical or verbal sectarian abuse since the 1994
IRA ceasefire. If you take away political murders
the level of sectarian violence has actually increased.
In a survey of 1,800 households last year 88% said
they would not enter an area dominated by the other
denomination, even by car, and 58% would not use shopping
or leisure facilities in areas controlled by the other
religion, even if they were better. This report by
Shirlow also showed that the standard ‘solutions’
presented by the British government are in reality
part of the problem. For example cross-community youth
work does more harm than good by allowing young people
to identify their perceived enemy. ‘All the kids
we spoke to said these programmes were a waste of
time and almost all the community workers thought
likewise. Of 214 kids who had attacked children of
the other religion, 158 said they recognised them
from cross-community schemes.’ For all those
reasons, sectarian stereotypes are likely to persist
for a very long time.
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