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The
definition of insanity is doing the same thing over
and over
and expecting different results
- Benjamin Franklin
Contrary
to what some cynics might believe, I myself genuinely
believe that - if Jesus Christ Himself descended today
from a heavenly cloud to the front steps of Belfast’s
City Hall, if He hugged the city’s new mayor
(or is it “Lord Mayor”?) in front of news
cameras, and if He then asked everyone in Northern
Ireland to embrace a 32-county republic - Northern
Unionists and Loyalists would assuredly flock to the
polls to do so.
Short
of His videotaped request to that effect, however,
I believe that Northern Unionists and Loyalists will
not be “enticed” to abandon their majoritarian
veto and sever their ties with Britain in favor of
32-county reunion; the entire history of post-partition
Unionism supports this view. In his recent “A
Case For Change,” Mr. Ciarán Irvine
states a contrary hope in response to my earlier “Wishing
for reunion but walking yet alone.”
In
his article, Mr. Irvine disagrees that he has failed
to take into account Unionists’ fundamental anti-reunion
views and feelings:
What,
otherwise, would be the point of[ my earlier suggestion
to bring] the Foreign Treaty powers of the German
Lander and Swiss Cantons into the mix? I explicitly
mentioned an instance whereby a Unionist-majority
tuath could have its own formal relationships with
the British Government and the Crown within the
Irish Federation. I can imagine instances where
Unionist-controlled local areas may have special
citizenship arrangements with Britain; where a member
of the Royal Family may hold, for example, the honorary
position of head of the local council - and many
other possibilities whereby Unionist areas can give
real and tangible expression to their British sense
of identity.
Two
responses immediately come to mind. First, these bones
thrown to Unionists would inevitably look rather puny
- more like choking hazards than anything they could
sink their political teeth into - compared to the
“formal relationships with the British Government
and the Crown” that Unionists currently have
and will otherwise continue to have for perhaps three
to six decades more. (Relatedly, Unionists would also
have to wonder whether an 80 percent Catholic majority
in a 32-county state might decide to eliminate all
such “formal relationships” after the new
32-county state had bedded itself down adequately.)
Second, as long as such “formal relationships”
remained legally permitted in the new all-Ireland
state, would each election - rather like each election
today in Northern Ireland - boil down to a divisive,
sectarian “pro-relationship versus anti-relationship”
battle?
Mr.
Irvine asks: “Surely, also, devolving real governmental
power to local areas and allowing treaties with other
Governments at a stroke negates Unionist fears of
being vastly outnumbered with no power in their own
land?” As suggested above, I believe that the
answer to this rhetorical question is an emphatic
“no, it would not negate those fears.”
However,
I feel a different point by Mr. Irvine is fully correct:
The
current consensus on “The North” within
the London and Dublin Establishments traps all of
us into permanent instability and, for Unionists,
the appalling prospect of a “death by a thousand
cuts” while for Republicans the equally-appalling
prospect of an entire community deluding itself
into thinking the lá will indeed tiocfaidh,
and being eternally disappointed.
Thus,
Mr. Irvine and I disagree on how to respond to this
overall situation, not whether it exists.
Mr.
Irvine maintains, in this respect, that my “stated
preference[ is] for a six-county independent state.”
Like other critics, he therein makes a small but noteworthy
error: my preference would be for a blissfully happy
32-county state. However, because reunion is virtually
impossible for several or many decades and because
painful socio-political problems in Northern Ireland
persist, I have advocated - albeit quite poorly -
a radical yet at least vaguely plausible constitutional
change that might prove helpful.
The
following is Mr. Irvine’s three-paragraph case
against independence:
Paul’s
stated preference for a six-county independent state
has been mooted, on and off, and mainly by Loyalist
paramilitaries, for decades. No one seems to be
buying, and for good reason.
One of the North’s primary problems is the
extreme insularity of the place. Wrapped up in the
integrity of its own eternal struggle, the outside
world has never really meant much to any of the
inhabitants. And an independent six-county state
will remain trapped in its own little bubble. Speaking
as someone who “escaped” from the claustrophobia
of Derry to the Republic 11 years ago, and as someone
who has spoken to many other similar “refugees”
- in the Republic, in Britain, in the US - the one
thing that always crops up in conversation and memory
is the day all we exiles realised just how dysfunctional
the place of our birth really was. Though we love
it all the same, and it will always be home, the
whole place needs the breath of fresh air that reconnecting
with the outside world will bring.
I cannot see that ever happening while those Six
Counties remain either attached by their poisonous
umbilical cord to Britain; or free to float in their
own space. In fact any UDI would merely exacerbate
the existing situation, no matter what idealistic
views of a happy-clappy democratic egalitarian Ulster
some people may hold. If we Northerners are not
sufficiently mature and outward-looking to operate
the GFA properly, how does Paul imagine we will
be magically transformed into a people that could
successfully operate an independent State?
The
general notion of independence has doubtless suffered,
to a certain extent, from the fact that, twenty years
ago, a political wing of the UDA advocated that approach.
Essentially ad hominem references to that fact seldom
acknowledge the intellectual interest given to the
topic by the likes of Nobel Peace Prize laureate Sean
MacBride (on behalf of the Provisional IRA), Belfast
academic/author/activist Dr. Stanley Worrell, former
British Prime Minister James Callaghan, and even Nobel
Peace Prize laureate and as-of-this-writing Northern
Ireland First Minister David Trimble.
Some
of Mr. Irvine’s other anti-independence points
sound like trite clichés, especially “an
independent six-county state will remain trapped in
its own little bubble” and “the whole place
needs the breath of fresh air that reconnecting with
the outside world[ or, at least, reconnecting with
Ireland’s other 26 counties] will bring.”
As
noted above, Mr. Irvine also tells us:
I
cannot see [major socio-political improvement] happening
while those Six Counties remain either attached
by their poisonous umbilical cord to Britain; or
free to float in their own space.
Responding
seriously to that statement, which I have heard in
various forms many times, is difficult to do without
sounding insulting, but here goes: maybe an important
problem here lies in Mr. Irvine’s vision. Perhaps
independence could work but perhaps Mr. Irvine, in
light of his current predilections and prejudices,
is literally unable to see that potential. As but
one indication of his possible error in this respect,
Mr. Irvine refers to my argument as involving “UDI,”
i.e., “unilateral declaration of independence”;
in fact, I have advocated not any UDI but, instead,
independence resulting from negotiation with London
and Dublin and implemented only with supermajority
support.
Perhaps,
as Mr. Irvine suggests, mine are “idealistic
views of a happy-clappy democratic egalitarian Ulster.”
(The expression “happy-clappy,” new to me,
is “[a] disparaging name for the form of Christian
religious observance which is informal, musical and
spontaneous.” “The Phrase Finder,”
http://phrases.shu.ac.uk/meanings/170875.html.)
Indeed,
a fundamental democratic point does seem to be at
the heart of this dispute on independence.
Mr.
Irvine in essence argues: “Independence should
be neither formally examined nor formally put to any
test at the polls because I, Ciarán Irvine,
and many other people as well, have divined that independence
either could not work or would not be accepted by
the voters.”
My
view, to the contrary, is that: (i) reunion has been
expressly and consistently rejected and looks to continue
to be rejected for another full generation or two;
(ii) power-sharing - developed by many of the bright
lights who assure us that independence cannot work
- may now be on the verge of its second failure;
yet (iii) still-untested independence has enough inherent
potential that it ought to be formally examined and
developed to the point whereat it is either formally
rejected or formally implemented. More specifically,
I have argued for the following “test” of
independence, as earlier published in The Blanket:
How
might this potentiality best be examined? Independence,
if it ever happened, would have to be the product
of joint efforts by the British and Irish governments
later approved by a super-majority (probably between
66 and 75 percent) of those voting in an independence
plebiscite in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the
following implementation steps might well be followed:
1.
The British and Irish governments would expressly
ask Northern Irelanders to encourage their respective
political representatives to take part in a transparent
constitutional convention presided over by outside
constitutional experts.
2.
After a constitutional and financial package for
independence has been approved by Britain, the
Republic, and the EU, and after adequate time
for public discussion, the British government
would hold a “simple majority” plebiscite
in Northern Ireland on the following ‘test-drive’
issue: “Do you want to see a ‘shadow’
election held to establish who would hold office
under this ‘ready-to-wear’ scheme if
that scheme were later approved in a ‘super-majority’
plebiscite?”
3.
If the majority did not want to take that ‘test-drive,’
negotiated independence would be well proven to
be inadequate and rightly abandoned.
4.
If the ‘shadow’ election proposal did
receive majority support, shadow officials would
then be chosen, but those officials would have
few powers. Assuming that the proposed constitutional
government were in the form of a ‘presidential’
system of government, the elected shadow president
and shadow legislators would be empowered to select,
in accordance with that system, an executive cabinet
and members of the judiciary. The only other power
they’d have would be to convene themselves
in their shadow positions; at least in theory,
they might convene to discuss whether to recommend
voter approval of the ultimate ‘super-majority’
plebiscite on the issue of Northern Ireland’s
negotiated independence.
5.
After some appropriate period of time following
an approved ‘shadow’ election, the ‘super-majority’
plebiscite would be held. Rejection thereof would
entail abandonment of an ‘independence’
approach. Acceptance thereof would trigger a transition
period, likely to be subject to a final ‘condition
precedent’ of independently approved ‘decommissioning,’
whereupon the shadow members (executive, judicial,
and legislative) of the government would be certified
as official.
Rather
than analyze whether that particular approach towards
possible independence suffers from any infirmities,
Mr. Irvine merely asks: “If we Northerners are
not sufficiently mature and outward-looking to operate
the GFA properly, how does Paul imagine we will be
magically transformed into a people that could successfully
operate an independent State?” That question
I would answer in two parts.
First,
a properly posed case for six-county independence,
unlike a successful case for “enticing reunion,”
would not depend on any magical transformation at
all. An independence case would, and could only, present
hard and honest truths to Northern Ireland’s
voters concerning mutual or reciprocal sacrifices
and benefits.
Second,
Mr. Irvine’s question proceeds from the fallacious
premise that Northerners’ not being “sufficiently
mature and outward-looking to operate the GFA properly”
has caused the main political problems over the past
several years (and may cause the GFA to fall entirely).
Instead, the fact is that the GFA has always had sizeable
- and, apparently, increasing - opposition within
the North’s Unionist community; that group’s
representatives have, rather unsurprisingly, taken
various steps to manifest their opposition. Whether
for good or ill, key inadequacies in the GFA may cause
it to become entirely incapable of operation if a
bit more than half of Unionists want it to fail; restated
somewhat, roughly 30 percent of Northern Ireland’s
voters have the power to bring down this well-intended
but obviously flawed political experiment. In an earlier
The Blanket piece, I described as follows five
key illaudable conditions inherent in the GFA:
1.
An institutionalization of sectarianism in government
through the prescribed Unionist/Nationalist split
in the Assembly.
2. An inbuilt potential for grave instability in
government, which may become quite manifest after
the May 2003 election if no Executive is mathematically
capable of being formed due to mandated weightings
of votes within the respective Unionist and Nationalist
camps.
3. An increasing problem of fundamental credibility
in that government, as makeshift patches are placed
over its constitutional holes. Last year, an unseemly
“queen for a day” transformation was specially
permitted for certain Alliance party Assembly members,
who temporarily became “official” Unionists
in order to help form an otherwise unformable Executive,
and it is not clear how far this Assembly version
of musical chairs might be permitted to continue.
For example, Assembly elections next year may see
the British government calling upon some SDLP and
Sinn Féin members to “share the pain”
by redesignating themselves temporarily as “Unionists”
in order to prop up an inadequate UUP bench; depending
on the mathematics in play, nay-saying Unionists
might then find themselves redesignating en masse
as Assembly “Nationalists” in order to
hole, from the other side of the aisle, the Good
Friday Agreement experiment.
4. An inability, via the d’Hondt system, to
exclude from the executive portion of this government
any political party with more than marginal support.
(For example, if a hypothetical Northern Ireland
Nazi party suddenly gained the Assembly votes of
roughly 10 percent in the six counties, it might
indeed be constitutionally impossible to keep a
Northern Ireland Nazi politician from holding a
ministerial position … at least not without
some new makeshift constitutional patch to the Good
Friday Agreement scheme.)
5. An inherent anticompetitive aspect to governance
in the region. Whereas fortunes do, from time to
time, favor Labour over Conservatives in Britain,
and Republicans over Democrats in the United States,
Northern Ireland will always have in its Executive
(while the Good Friday Agreement scheme persists)
Ulster Unionist Party Ministers, Sinn Féin
Ministers, Social Democratic and Labour Party Ministers,
and Democratic Unionist Party Ministers, and their
respective numbers will change rather little. Short
of voting so as to make governance through the Executive
mathematically impossible, Northern Ireland in practice
will have virtually no opportunity to change the
overall “philosophical” nature of its
Executives; hence, the lack of political competitiveness
in Northern Ireland’s governance.
Each
and all of those key inadequacies could be entirely
avoided through a properly structured independence
constitution.
Briefly
returning to Mr. Irvine’s reference to “idealistic
views of a happy-clappy democratic egalitarian Ulster,”
the following is the conclusion of a letter I recently
sent to one of Mr. Irvine’s fellow Northern Irelanders:
As
a pessimist, I think any vote on any independence
plan would - more likely than not - fail. However,
I’d be infinitely happier to see such a plan
rejected at the polls than to watch Northern Ireland
in continued turmoil, “sagely” knowing
without trying that independence simply could not
succeed. The old basketball phrase - ”Never
up, never in” - remains one of my favorites,
particularly in this respect. Samuel Beckett’s
entreaty also rings true here: “Try again.
Fail again. Fail better.”
Mr.
Irvine’s view of independence as being inadequate
also brings to mind yet again a John Stuart Mill thought
which I often quote: “There is the greatest difference
between presuming an opinion to be true, because,
with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not
been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose
of not permitting its refutation.” Maybe people
like Mr. Irvine should regard a formal inquiry into
possible independence as a way for their insight and
prescience to be publicly and definitively demonstrated.
To
his credit, Mr. Irvine puts thought and effort into
trying to address the Northern Ireland question. He
does so, however, by proposing reunion, which he sincerely
wants but which Unionists have repeatedly rejected
and which they disdain unto this day.
Mr.
Irvine might instead say something along the following
lines: “I want reunion, and you Unionists want
continued union. A theoretical middle ground exists:
six-county independence. Right now, I strongly think
independence would not work, and I might in any event
ultimately decide not to support it. However, the
unarguable fact is that possible independence hasn’t
yet been formally examined, and I’d be willing
to help examine it now, in good faith, if you would
do so as well.”
Which
of these two proposals does Mr. Irvine believe would
have a greater impact on the Northern Ireland situation?
Which course does it seem more likely that the wise
Benjamin Franklin and the eminent John Stuart Mill
would have urged?
Perhaps
no one regrets more than I the fact that independence
critics typically content themselves with offhanded
statements along the lines of “it can’t
work, so let’s just forget it,” whereas
the rebuttals inevitably take much longer to set out.
Should any reader have made it to this point, my apologies
for the necessary prolixity here.
Two
pithy sentences from Mr. Irvine, though, in conclusion:
“Time for change. Time for hope.”
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