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In
a St. Patrick’s Day writing titled “Republicans’
Big Risk,” I suggested that Gary Kent displayed
in his recent article “No more Irish groundhogs”
rather conventional British Constitutionalist thoughts
and that he thereby inadvertently revealed - but without
any evident appreciation of its broader implications
- the source of the enormous problem facing militant
Irish Republicanism. At its base, that problem is
this: because any and all governmental rules can be
changed at any time by any British government, it
is literally impossible for Republicanism to “do
a deal” politically - other than through unconditional
surrender (a step which that group seems, apparently,
not yet prepared to take) - which is guaranteed to
stick. (See also, e.g., “The Fundamental Problem
Of Non-Constitutional Law Vis-À-Vis The Northern
Ireland Question,” The Blanket (9 March
2003).)
Thus,
Republicans will literally have no recourse should
the British government unilaterally choose to amend
or repeal any aspect of British law involving the
Good Friday Agreement unless, whether morally or
immorally, Republicanism holds onto the unarguably
undemocratic leverage of its own paramilitary weaponry.
For
example, on the day after the “war” is declared
over and all Republican weapons have been publicly
handed over, London could decide that devolution is,
in its fine judgment, an entirely poor idea after
all and that it should instead fully integrate all
of the United Kingdom into one central governmental
authority (Westminster, of course). Or London might
that day decide simply that a certain number of Northern
Ireland Assembly members should be permitted to get
together in order to eject other members from that
body and/or from the Northern Ireland Executive. Or
London might similarly decide - as Mr. Kent has suggested
- that d’Hondt should go out the window and some
form of “voluntary coalition” process be
instituted. Or, on that fine day or on any day
at all subsequent, London might decide to tweak, or
change drastically, the GFA in any other way it might
see fit.
Somewhat
surprising is that mindsets in Britain and Ireland,
north and south, are such that these concepts are
not better and more broadly understood. An RTE radio
interviewer, for example, recently asked incredulously,
almost dumbfoundedly, why doesn’t the “Republican
family” just wrap it all up and hand in the weapons?
Yet
even pundits who will acknowledge knowing the answer
to that basic question - as has Brian Walker, “Allow
Sinn Fein to find own political level” (Belfast
Telegraph, 17 April 2003) - can falter badly when
taking on the next logical question of how to deal
with that substantial problem.
To
his credit, Mr. Walker has not only the intelligence
to understand but also the forthrightness to admit
aloud that Republicans do “certainly” have
“[a] political case” for “messing up
the happy scenario of Hillsborough.” Similar
to the rationale described above, he wrote: “[Republicans’]
consistent argument has always been: implement the
whole Agreement and then we’ll see how the IRA
respond; why should we change now?” Still further,
and still more bravely, he wrote:
But
a moral case? Perhaps, yes, even here. Today’s
awkwardly timed publication of the latest Stevens
report on collusion between the security forces
and loyalist paramilitaries is a reminder of dark
deeds republicans are not alone in never wanting
to repeat.
We can hardly be surprised if the rank and file
of an undefeated private “army” to want
to see the final colour of the policing reforms
first, before they dismantle their own machine.
Nor is it wholly unreasonable for them to probe
what’s behind the wholesale transfer of the
British security apparatus from military intelligence
and the beleaguered Special Branch to MI5, leaving
it less accountable than ever it was under the RUC
and the Army.
On
how to address a big part of the overall problem,
Mr. Walker recognized that the possibility of a “voluntary
coalition [in the Executive] to replace the compulsory
coalition of the Agreement is very beguiling”
for many Unionists, but he posited that “right
wing unionism’s notions of voluntary coalition
smacks of excluding Sinn Fein forever and it will
never happen.”
Then,
after a pretty impressive start, Mr. Walker faded
off into the same sort of muddleheaded thinking that
seems to strike the minds of so many trained within
British Constitutionalism: essentially, ‘if we
perceive a problem, let’s just figure out which
laws need to be changed or added.’ On this basis,
perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the Good Friday
Agreement - equal executive powersharing according
to levels of support at the polls (“d’Hondt,”
for short) - must now, in Mr. Walker’s view,
be rejected and simply discarded:
The
present d’Hont [sic] system, designed to create
sufficient consensus led by party elites, produced
sufficient deadlock instead. The review of the institutions
in the autumn should consider the implications of
abolishing the “unionist, nationalist, other”
designations and substituting simple majorities
set at high thresholds, to create carrots as well
as sticks for compliance. This would give fair weight
at last to the smaller parties and allow the rest
of the Assembly to omit republicans from office
until they have satisfied the necessary conditions,
without bringing down the whole institution. It
might also force a commitment on the Assembly system,
one way or another, from the DUP.
… A voluntary coalition might well compel more
integrity all round. The two Governments should
get interested quickly, while making it clear that
any voluntary coalition that sets out to exclude
Sinn Fein automatically, is doomed to failure.
Like
Mr. Kent earlier, Mr. Walker thus suggests that an
offending albeit “enshrined” aspect of the
GFA can and should be readily chucked (yes, I know,
so that the “chucks” can get chucked), and
these obviously marvelous institutions at Stormont
might thereby be perpetuated. (Through his argument,
Mr. Walker reminded me of my rather different October
2002 suggestion that the British and Irish governments
should act to prevent “the already wrongful ‘There
Is No Alternative’ dogma from metastasizing into
‘GFA über alles’ irrationality.”)
Mr.
Walker added, though, a twist to Mr. Kent’s conventional
wisdom: i.e., that these two governments, in rejiggering
the GFA to allow “voluntary coalitions,”
suddenly become proficient mind readers and heart
readers so as to be able to discern which proposed
executive coalitions at Stormont are planning to exclude
Sinn Féin for permissible reasons and which
are doing so for reasons impermissible.
Although
people in Ireland and Britain have long been legitimately
concerned with the distinct prospect of failing in
unconventional political efforts - hence their basically
understandable reluctance to venture into the terra
incognito of possible negotiated independence
(on which topic I’ve written from time to time)
- nonetheless history demonstrates that those same
people, over the last three decades, have raised the
art of failure through conventional political means
virtually to the level of science.
Their
orthodox political views on Northern Ireland bring
to mind the story of the group of physicians who collectively
point to a graveyard filled with thousands of their
erstwhile patients, boldly asserting it as proof of
their vast expertise in conventional medical techniques.
Conventional
wisdom is, though, quite often more conventional than
it is wise.
If,
as seems the case, Mr. Walker wants to offer the British
and Irish governments insightful aid, maybe he needs
first to take another few steps, perhaps large ones,
away from the execrably unsuccessful political orthodoxy
long attendant to the Northern Ireland question. By
doing so, he may accurately conclude that British
Constitutionalism is the source of the underlying
problem rather than the means of that problem’s
resolution.
Washington, D.C. lawyer Paul A. Fitzsimmons wrote
Independence for Northern Ireland: Why and How
(1993) (pfitzsim@wrightrobinson.com).
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