In
his article �Blair leading negotiating pack without
any serious followers� (Belfast Telegraph, 18 December 2004), Northern
Ireland political pundit Barry White well described�a
week before the infamous �26.5 million bank heist
in Belfast�some of the most fundamental deficiencies
and failures of the region�s �peace process�:
Too bad, Tony, another devolution deal has gone the way of all the others,
no matter how hard you tried. You got the DUP
and Sinn Fein to come a long way together - though
maybe they were saying �yes, yes, yes� without
paying much attention to the small print, because
they knew an agreement would never be reached.
[The Autumn 2004 talks achieved a] success of a kind, although the �ifs�
and �buts� that were ignored in the Comprehensive
Agreement proposals will need a lot more explanation
before the public accepts them. Yet I don�t meet anyone who believes
that after more than seven years, you or Bertie
Ahern are �tantalisingly close� to a solution.
[Emphasis added.]
....
The fact is that ever since your arrival in 1997, we�ve been in a state
of political turmoil. ...
By a process of constructive ambiguity, appeasement and hand-holding,
you helped achieve the Good Friday Agreement in
1998. Since then, in a political sense, it�s been
all downhill.
It�s never admitted, in official quarters, but the institutions which
were so carefully constructed, with so many checks
and balances, have never worked well. �
The pattern is that as crises occur - because the UUP leadership accepted
undeliverable deals or because of IRA activity
- the Assembly is suspended and more promises
are made. When they aren�t kept, there is another
crisis, followed by talks and another crisis.
....
Now you�ve published your proposals, presenting them as near-agreements
when we all know that nothing is agreed until
everything is. And not only the SDLP are worried
by what they read. Surely we should be trying
to lessen community tensions, by playing down
differences in the Assembly? The proposals do
the opposite, by providing the potential for block
votes and vetoes on almost every issue.
Assembly candidates must declare their �national� allegiance, before
election and any party that refuses to vote for
the whole executive, after it is named, forfeits
its right to sit on it. That�s going to be troublesome,
for a start.
Mr. White then rhetorically asked what �the Blair
legacy� will be regarding Northern Ireland, and he concluded, in
so many words, a fair amount bad and not all that
much good.
But,
with all having been tried and having failed in
this �process,� the fact of the matter is that
the key participants to this conflict�preeminently including Tony Blair�elect to sit around indefinitely,
pretending that the Good Friday Agreement is not
cadaverous and deciding not to take a free swing
at something different, radical, but still too daring to be discussed above a polite whisper.
A
little more background, however, before a few
less-than-polite whispers from me�my last,
I hope and believe�on possible negotiated independence
for Northern Ireland.
Since
time immemorial, people have been fighting floods,
famine, pestilence, disease, economic privation,
and general social conflict. Our capacities in
these battles, although very obviously not infinite,
are considerable. Particularly in the field of
government, almost all of western civilization
has in recent centuries done reasonably well in
putting together the basic structures of regional
governance. Western Europe, with exceptional interludes such
as the one Corporal Hitler instigated, has very
broadly been part of this success story.
By
contrast, however, governance in Ireland�s northeast
six counties was, throughout Northern Ireland�s
initial 1921-72 period of existence, that of grossly
iniquitous and ultimately unsuccessful sectarian
majoritarianism. Over the three decades since
that period, orthodox effort after orthodox effort
has failed to establish a workable democracy in
a land where virtually everyone is the same color,
where everyone speaks a common language, and where
everyone who causes any trouble comes from a supposedly
Christian culture of one variety or another.
Even
in that largely homogeneous setting, the people
just can�t find an intra-U.K. devolution plan
that works, they certainly cannot agree on any
form of 32-county reunion, and their �leaders��again
including, preeminently, Mr. Blair�obdurately
refuse to consider formally examining the untested
middle ground of possible independence for Northern Ireland.
Quite
frankly, this tale of woe is one of generation-to-generation
incompetence, an incompetence almost universally
prevalent among Britain�s and Ireland�s Northern Ireland �experts� in politics,
in academics, and in the media.
The
tenor of the foregoing notwithstanding, I have,
in recent months, achieved a measure of success
of a different sort through my gaining, in a Franciscan
sense, the solace of accepting that, having gone
at this project for a fair bit of time, I can
do little or nothing more to achieve my goal of
helping to facilitate a formal examination of
this settlement possibility.
Unsurprisingly,
no small concern of mine, particularly over the
past several years, has been determining with
an adequate degree of moral certitude when appropriately
to desist from further efforts in a matter as
important as seeking a solution to the Northern Ireland question. Throwing in
this towel prematurely would itself assuredly
be illaudable, and merely relying on the broadly
held and lazy dogma of �impossibility� is obviously
directly contrary to the notion of actively challenging
that false dogma.
In
this respect, I�ve had the good fortune of having
had over the past couple of years a passing acquaintance
with a Northern Ireland leader who not only won
a Nobel Peace Prize for his mid-1990�s efforts
there but who also himself, as an academic at
least as late as 1988, publicly advocated
Northern Ireland�s independence, then referring
to that new political status�albeit quite erroneously�as
an �inevitability.�
In
mid‑October 2004, as a last-ditch effort
on my own small independence project, I contacted
by air courier the Rt. Hon. David Trimble, asking
that he take up this point privately with Mr. Blair
or, in the alternative, that he just recommend
I pack in these wee efforts entirely (see attached letter). In that I�ve become over the years used to snubs
from others among the great and good on this topic
(who have, though, been not quite great or good
enough actually to resolve this infamous �Northern Ireland question� themselves),
I take no large personal offense at Mr. Trimble�s
not having deigned to provide a response.
The
silver lining here for me is a notable confluence
of circumstances, namely
the GFA having failed conspicuously,
to the point where Mr. Trimble�s own political
position has diminished very markedly as a direct
result,
Mr. Trimble having himself publicly
advocated Northern Ireland�s independence and his
having recently had the opportunity to try to
press this point privately with Mr. Blair,
but Mr. Trimble�s having
chosen to leave unanswered my missive of October
2004, even in the face of that GFA failure and
the absence of any democratic alternative thereto,
which
together must mean that there is little or nothing
more for me to do in this regard.
Some
months ago, I�d relatedly note, Mr. Trimble accused
the Democratic Unionist Party of letting the IRA
�off the hook� by not pushing ahead adequately
in late-2004 negotiations.
However�especially
in light of the possibilities which would have
been afforded by a �key embellishment� to the
logistical aspects of my independence proposals
(as discussed in the attached 26 September 2004
letter to Jonathan Powell)�I think Tony Blair
and very likely too Mr. Trimble have themselves
let everyone off the hook by choosing easy, unbrave, and unsuccessful political orthodoxy
over a difficult, low-probability-of-ultimate-success
alternative � an alternative which could, though,
have been readily examined formally at very little
actual cost, political or otherwise.
Burt
Rutan�who knows more than most the meaning of
the phrase �per ardua ad astra,� via his historic X-Plane Prize success�has posited
that truly important research takes place only
in settings where half of those hearing of a radical
proposal knee‑jerkedly reject it as impossible.
That
righteous concept is apparently utterly unfathomable
to all but perhaps a very few in Britain (a land whose most noted
living inventor, aiming a bit lower than the stars,
devised a bagless vacuum cleaner). Unfortunately,
in a genuinely historic sense, among that knowing
few is almost certainly not
the British politician Anthony Charles Lynton
Blair.
I
do and will yet look back with much fondness on
the twenty-some years that I worked, from time
to time, on this project, regretting mainly that
Northern Irelanders will never have the chance
to make their own personal and private decision
at the polls on a worthy, ready‑to‑wear
independence proposal. For as difficult as it
may indeed be for many�especially in Britain,
even on Downing Street�to comprehend, negative
information is valuable, and trying yet ultimately
failing to do something important is better than never having tried at all. A thin gruel of consolation
for me personally, but, hell, it�s something.
All
the foregoing notwithstanding, force of long habit
impels me to pen a final if pointless note to
the man �in charge�:
Mr. Blair:
As you would discern from my various
scribblings, including this note, I tend to believe
that few if any among your circle of advisors
would ever be as forthright as I am on the subject
of Northern Ireland.
Especially in light of necessarily
limited time left for you in Downing Street, you�ve
not many choices regarding your own Northern Ireland legacy (naturally, I�m
assuming here arguendo
that that legacy is of import to you).
In fact, beyond simply throwing up
your hands and expressly consigning Northern Ireland
to another generation or more of undemocratic
direct rule, your options are really but two:
First, you could continue down the
same GFA path that has already, effort after effort,
year after year, failed repeatedly. (Most particularly
in the wake of that wee bank caper last month
in Belfast, a good many believe that, in this
mode, nothing at all will be done before 2006
� but, even thereafter, no one should hold his
breath while awaiting a �tantalisingly close�
political settlement brought forth by means of
that Godot Friday Agreement.)
Second, you could attempt the radical
approach of investigating possible negotiated
independence, in the manner I described this past
September to your Chief of Staff.
That first approach will result in the following scene taking
place over and over during the next three decades
or so in your own home: your holding out your
hands, showing a small gap between opposed palms,
and boring your guests to tears about how you
were supposedly �that close� to a comprehensive
Northern Ireland success. As recently suggested
by Barry White, that same claim is even today
rejected by more than a few.
The second approach would, more likely
than not, lead as well to failure albeit�by distinct
and morally important contrast�brave and honest
failure. That result would come about either:
(a) because, at the outset, one of the key
Northern Ireland parties expressly betrayed itself
as fascistic; (b) because, at the end of
the day, no adequate proposal could in fact be
fashioned via a first-and-last-ever formal independence
investigation; or (c) because, ultimately
at the polls, the people of Northern Ireland chose
to reject a plan for their region�s rebirth through
fair and workable political independence.
Failure through this second approach
would, however, not
occur�as it has with the GFA�because of inherent,
ineluctable, and irremediable �constitutional�
deficiencies dodged and masked to the extent possible
(i.e., inadequately) by the powers that
be.
Mr. Blair, I�ll not soon forget how
you claimed a couple years back of Britons: �[W]e�re
at our best when at our boldest.�
Is, though, in all honesty, the boldest
thing about Britain merely the fact of your
having made that prideful assertion? Does your
claim actually damn with faint praise, as Britain�s
boldness seems of a rather limp and tepid variety
and as Britain�s �best� is, as a result, pretty
mediocre if not indeed poor? In this regard, the
following is one Irishman�s first draft of this
part of Northern Ireland�s history, presumably
a description you�d not hope be adopted as the
final version:
The peace
process is based on a series of Orwellian lies
that mean that no contract has value, no word
of honour has any meaning, no undertaking is binding.
In this diseased and wretched universe, men who
murder are honoured; those who do not are abased.
And from this despicable mess, lasting so-called
democratic institutions cannot possibly be constructed.
Kevin Myers, Sunday Telegraph, 26 December 2004
Is really, in all truth and candor,
the Good Friday Agreement the best and boldest
that Britain can do for Northern Ireland?
Even at this late date in your Labour
Government, you could still dispositively prove
me wrong�not least in my making these rather rude
characterizations�by your own bravely attempting
a formal examination of possible negotiated independence.
You are the one and only person on the face of the planet who could make
that attempt.
If, though, you continue to reject
that radical approach, you
will have to resign yourself to a legacy of
distinctly unbold failure in Northern Ireland.
Mr. Blair, there is no alternative.
Unhappily, I�m confident that the
path of resignation is the one you will continue
to follow because�I believe�you
are simply too British to do anything other than
to choose orthodox, unimaginative, time-tested
failure over a small chance for success through
your undertaking a bold, open, untried course
of action. (Cf. Brian Walker, �Depths of disillusion
deepen after robbery�: �What
Blair will not budge from is the close British-Irish
relationship and the basic structure of the Agreement,
now permanent features of life.� Belfast Telegraph,
13 January 2005 (emphasis added).) Last year,
I wrote in a related vein to a Northern Ireland pundit:
I'm sick of people in Britain and Ireland who�because of laziness
or cowardice or otherwise�prefer the devil they
know to the unfallen angel they don�t know and
won�t try to seek out.
Maybe history will little mark and
maybe only a few thousand people scattered around
the globe will ever know, through the Internet�s
electronic ephemera, that you did have a clear
opportunity to make a courageous new effort towards
a genuine and honest settlement in that six‑county
region.
But you yourself will know.
Of course, the saddest part of all
this is that many more than just you yourself
will have to live�sometimes quite painfully�with
the results, and the uncourageous inadequacies,
of your own �leadership.�
P.A.F.
The
best of luck indeed to the people of Northern Ireland. It looks like, in Mr. Blair�s
care, they will very sorely need it.
Paul A. Fitzsimmons
14 January 2005
16 October 2004
BY AIR COURIER
The
Rt. Hon. David Trimble
Leader
Ulster Unionist Party
Cunningham
House
429 Holywood Road
Belfast BT4 2LN, Northern Ireland
UNITED KINGDOM
Dear
Mr. Trimble:
��������������� Greetings once again.
��������������� On 26 September 2004, I sent an
extremely forthright letter to Jonathan Powell,
copying the office of Mr. Ahern (�Senior�)
as well as Dr. Reiss here in D.C. That letter,
appended hereto (as �Attachment A�), did
little or nothing to disguise my exasperation
at the fact that a half‑dozen years of Good
Friday Agreement failure have apparently not been
enough to get the English thinking in any new
ways regarding the Northern Ireland question.
I told Mr. Powell therein that, in an effort to
burn whatever bridges might exist in the wake
of my small efforts, I�d publish that letter and
be done with the whole mess if I did not hear
back from him substantively by October 15.
Naturally�as I noted at the letter�s end�I expected
to receive no such reply, and indeed none has
arrived (though the post did bring an unexceptional
and uninformative acknowledgement of receipt,
stating merely that Mr. Powell had referred my
letter to the Northern Ireland Office, thereby
proving that the buck does not stop in his office).
��������������� Since I wrote that 26 September letter, however, several things have occurred
to me regarding terminating these efforts.
��������������� First, it seems to me highly likely
that you yourself could readily receive a one-on-one
(unbugged) with Mr. Blair. Were that the
case, you could�at least in theory�elect to take
that opportunity to put privately to Mr. Blair
(and maybe even convince him) that now really
is the time to take a hard look at this paradigm
shift. As I�ve argued ad
nauseam, the chances of failure for possible
negotiated independence would surely be greater
than not, but people in Ireland and Britain would be no worse off after such a failure
than they are right now. It seems abundantly clear
to me that, if the effort is not made at this
point, it never will be made; not least from events
over the past month, it also seems reasonably
clear (as, indeed, it did to me in 1984‑85)
that decades more of socio-political stalemate
will, in that setting, follow.
��������������� Second, it seems to me at least
possible you might examine this situation and
actually elect to make that private yet perhaps
very important pitch to Mr. Blair. Your doing
so�(a) on a point regarding which you earlier
took an affirmative public position (e.g., your 1988 comment: �When we come
to agree on the inevitability of some form of
independence, we can shape our political offensive.�)
and (b) in circumstances where, more than
three decades on since the fall of the first and
only stable albeit hugely undemocratic local government
in Northern Ireland, all the orthodox devolutionary
approaches have been tried and have failed�could,
I think, be a brave and Christian (and maybe even
�patriotic�) act, under these challenging conditions.
God knows, any pitch from you would mean a hellova
lot more than any of mine ever has or ever would.
��������������� Third, instead of my acquiescing
in and merely noting for the record that this
untried middle‑ground idea is now going
completely, permanently, and unceremoniously down
the toilet because of the inaction of some all-but-anonymous
British bureaucrats (particularly including one
man recently described, by you, as �the prime
minister�s gofer�), it seems to me that an ultimate
public rejection of this idea would instead far
better come from you yourself, as a person who
lives in Northern Ireland, who has long been a
political leader there, who has had at very least substantial earlier interest
in the topic of independence, and who, not least,
has gained enough world attention on the subject
of Northern Ireland to have garnered a corresponding
Nobel Peace Prize.
��������������� As further background to my overall
argument, I�ve appended (as �Attachment B�) a
21 July 2004 letter to one of your fellow UUP
members, Alex Kane. That letter, replying rather
pointedly as well to a note from him that same
morning, put a very plain request to him:
Alex�after all this haranguing by me�please have yourself
a cup of tea, then take another pass through this
lengthy message, and finally, after adequate contemplative
meditation, write me a note saying that you�ve
decided now boldly to step up to the plate on
this cross-community heresy or, in the alternative,
a note just telling me frankly to bugger off,
so that I can be accordingly guided. Given the
lateness of the hour on this project, a lukewarm,
put-it-on-the-long-finger response will be worthless
and silence worse still.
That
request was, however, rejected, in that I received
only a �lukewarm, put-it-on-the-long-finger response�
from him. Of course, I�m hopeful that�as someone
who, unlike Mr. Kane, has and has long had an
actual leadership position and role in your society�you
would take on more forthrightly a similar invitation
which I hereby respectfully convey.
��������������� Thus is above what will be my last grasp at a last straw regarding
this independence heresy � something an American
football fan, regardless of religious belief or
denomination, would term a �Hail Mary� shot.
��������������� If this last straw fails to keep�or
get�afloat the possibility of negotiated independence
(and I�m loathe to project the probabilities thereof
here), I intend, inter alia, to invite our mutual friend here in town to a very private
wake for it at a local watering hole, where I
would both buy his fill and lead that bittersweet
celebration of its passing.
��������������� Naturally, I look forward to your
response. Should none arrive by 24 November, I
shall have further reason to give thanks the next
day by dispositively assuming that none will follow,
and I shall thereby be guided accordingly.
��������������� In any event, thank you for your
kind attention here.
Sincerely,
Paul A. Fitzsimmons
PAF:
attachments
ATTACHMENT A
September 26, 2004
BY TELECOPY
Mr.
Jonathan Powell
Chief
of Staff
10 Downing Street
London
SW1A 2AA, England
UNITED KINGDOM
Dear
Mr. Powell:
��������������� Your Government�s responses to date to the failure of the Good Friday Agreement,
at Leeds Castle and thereafter,
have been predictable though nonetheless, of course,
disappointing. Unarguable
here is that, after more than a half-dozen years
of trying rather intensively, you-all have markedly
failed to resolve the Northern
Ireland question.
��������������� Regardless of why your Government
yet�apparently�elects to reject my unorthodox
and highly challenging proposals on formally investigating
possible independence (although, as you may have
concluded, I believe that rejection could have
a lot to do with plain old-fashioned guts), I am
well beyond ready to conclude this long and unavailing
middle‑ground effort, which I began two
decades ago quite uninvitedly. Frankly, I think
that I�m probably sicker of you‑all than
you-all are of me, though I�d accept that that
contest might be tight.
��������������� Therefore, in an effort to burn
whatever bridges may exist in this respect, I�ll
publish this letter and its attachments under
the title �Too Bad The
North�s Future Depends On Tony Blair�s Bravery�
unless�with, obviously, the odds largely against�I�ve
somehow substantially misread your Government�s
position and you choose to inform me, on or before October 15, of my error.
��������������� Though any additional effort here
on this score may be worth damned little or nothing,
I�ll nevertheless arrogate to myself this last
opportunity to make what will be a comparatively
brief argument, against the background of something
written on 24 September by one of those bright
BBC-Northern Ireland reporters:
If, as seems likely, none of the parties budge, then Tony
Blair may have to play his best hand.
He has been robbed of a deal in time for his annual party
conference.
However, legislation could be pushed through providing
for some changes to the Stormont rules, changes
which the government believes the parties will
tolerate if not embrace.
Then the suspension of the assembly could be lifted in
a take-it-or-leave-it challenge.
If the politicians refuse to pick up the gauntlet that
would lead to fresh elections.
Given their recent strength at the ballot box, the DUP
may regard that as an empty threat.
��������������� Is Mr. Blair�s �best hand� here
really �push[ing]� legislation through Westminster providing �for some changes to the Stormont
rules�? That approach will
result in rejection, and likely cross-community
rejection, thereof within the recalled Assembly.
Resultant new elections in Northern Ireland under the GFA will entail a still firmer establishment both of the now‑dominant
parties and of the current impasse. That situation
will lead, in turn, to the sort of generations-long, inadequate, and
unhappy joint authority which�via our mutual friend
Matthew Rycroft�I implored your Government a half-decade
ago to avoid falling directly into, through uninspired
governmental inertia or otherwise. (Cf. a Sunday Life (Belfast) report today that your Government �will
now mothball the Assembly, following the failure
by local parties to reach agreement on IRA decommissioning
and ministerial accountability.�)
��������������� Instead of languidly permitting
yourselves to succumb to another exceedingly predictable
pattern of orthodox failure, Mr. Blair could instead
now courageously say, along lines earlier suggested,
something like the following:
Negotiated independence
is not our preferred approach for a potential
settlement. Our preferred approach remains a fair
and workable solution within the context of the
Good Friday Agreement.
Moreover, we
believe rather firmly that, in any event, an independence
plan would, more likely than not, fail to be implemented,
for one reason or another.
These considerations
notwithstanding, we have decided to put this GFA
scheme completely on ice for the time being and
to try to undertake formally what may�as we are
fully well aware�turn out to be an entirely unsuccessful
attempt towards a radical middle‑ground
settlement through negotiated independence.
In
the emphasized text below is an important and
perhaps key embellishment to that radical tack:
Our first formal step in this direction�a constitutional
convention presided over by knowledgeable experts�is,
however, conditional in two respects.
First, if the IRA does not expressly state, in response
to this announcement, that it will fully respect
and abide by plebiscite approval of independence,
at a 70-percent-or-higher level, through its fully
disarming and standing down immediately after
such a vote, we shall abandon this inquiry.
Second, if the IRA makes that
commitment but if any of the four largest political
parties in Northern
Ireland thereafter announces formally
that it will boycott such a constitutional convention,
we shall likewise proceed no further concerning
this settlement possibility.
Thus, the IRA and any of those four political parties
will have the power to block consideration of
this new approach, which approach could in any
event be implemented only after 70-percent-or-higher
approval at the polls. Restated a bit, if any
of those groups sees fit to deny the people of
Northern Ireland any chance to settle on this
supermajority basis, that group can unilaterally�and,
I think history will record, fascistically�do
so.
If, on the other hand, these groups respectively conclude,
appropriately, that they are comfortable with
leaving any ultimate decision on this matter to
the voters�realizing that a mere 30-percent-plus-one
of the electorate would have, at the end of the
day, the power to veto any ultimate independence
proposal�then we will initiate this constitutional
convention, with
none of those groups having made any advance commitment
of support, and we shall do so notwithstanding
our realistic view that the odds are decidedly
against any ultimate settlement along these lines.
For
the record, I would not suggest this �embellishment�
were I not reasonably confident that indeed none
of those five groups would, under such circumstances,
play the part of fascist in this wee Northern Ireland melodrama.
��������������� Instead, my largest and continuing
doubts involve�again quite frankly�what role your
Government will itself now choose to play: that
of phlegmatic functionaries who are content to
follow in well-worn paths of failure or that of
genuine leaders and statesmen who, per
ardua ad astra, really are at their best when
at their boldest.
��������������� As, inter alia, an eternal pessimist, I must and do expect to receive
nothing substantive in response hereto, but I�d
nonetheless reiterate my thanks for your personal
courtesies some years back.
Sincerely,
�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Paul A. Fitzsimmons
PAF:
attachments
cc
(w/attachments):
��������������� Mr. Dermot McCarthy, Secretary
General, Department of the Taoiseach (by telecopy)
��������������� Mitchell
B. Reiss, Ph.D., U.S. Department of State (by
telecopy)
September 10, 2004
BY TELECOPY
Mitchell B. Reiss, Ph.D.
Director, Office of Policy Planning
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20520
Re:���������
Northern Ireland
Dear
Dr. Reiss:
Following the less-than-uplifting reports from Sedgefield
today, and having heard yesterday that you will
be attending next week�s Leeds Castle talks, I
thought I�d send on to you, via an enclosure hereto,
what may be my final love note, of September 6,
to our friend Jonathan Powell.
As my time on this wee project may indeed be drawing
to a close, I�ve lately been allowing myself added
measures of forthrightness. For example, to a
leading Northern pundit I�ve been corresponding
with over the past couple of years, I recently
wrote the following:
If it�s not already clear, please allow me
to state at this point that, for as sick as some
people may be of hearing from me about all this,
I too am sick of this fight, important as the
�Northern Ireland question� is. I�m sick of stating obvious
truths and so often getting in response blinkered,
erroneous, yet nonetheless hallowed dogmatisms.
I�m sick of the fact that many have given me words
of encouragement but seldom more than private
words, because they won�t raise their heads above
the parapets for fear of what others will think
about some basic socio‑political verities
(David Vance being, to date, the most notable
exception to that rule). I�m sick of people in
Britain and Ireland who�because of laziness or cowardice or otherwise�prefer
the devil they know to the unfallen angel they
don�t know and won�t try to seek out. I�m sick
of those who think that evading difficult questions
is an honorable or morally acceptable practice.
Continuing in that rather frank vein, my bet is that
you�re a pretty damned smart guy who is certainly
interested in trying to advance the ball vis-�-vis
the Northern Ireland conflict but who is by no stretch of anyone�s imagination any sort of expert
on the situation. To whatever extent you�ve earlier
been advised by purported experts that �GFA �ber
alles� is the way forward�hasn�t everyone,
or almost everyone, after all been saying for
years and years that �there is no alternative�
to the GFA?�perhaps Mr. Blair�s repeated
signals of late, including earlier today, that
he�s just about to chuck that peculiar institution
are causing you now to reevaluate that advice.
Yet further in this same vein, if you yourself aspire
to be more than a mere functionary in your current
position, you might well give some rather strenuous
thought to the notion that maybe now really is
the time for Britain and Ireland to open their
minds to the possibility of a genuine paradigm
shift here. Your stating�or, if applicable, reiterating�within
the course of discussions next week that the U.S.
would stand shoulder-to-shoulder with London and
Dublin in this brave investigation might make
a difference of historic measure. Those governments
may need (and even appreciate) a bit of cover�and
a bit of back-stiffening�in this regard.
Continuing in this blunt vein beyond any arguable boundary
of good manners, if you elect to reject the suggestions
made in the previous paragraph, you will come
to conclude that you have added nothing of value
to this situation and, far worse, that you yourself
have helped squander the small yet nevertheless
best chance Northern Ireland has to move dramatically
forward. An additional generation or two may wind
up paying the price for multinational timorousness
here.
Though you rejected, sub silentio, my earlier invitation to meet, I hope you would nonetheless
feel free to contact me hereafter as you see fit.
Dominus vobiscum.
Sincerely,
�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������
Paul A. Fitzsimmons
PAF:
Enclosure
September 6, 2004
BY TELECOPY
Mr. Jonathan Powell
Chief of Staff
10 Downing Street
London SW1A 2AA, England
UNITED KINGDOM
Dear Mr. Powell:
���������������
As the BBC reports rather unsurprisingly
today that �Sinn Fein President Gerry Adams has
said that the Good Friday Agreement stands in
�considerable difficulty� ahead of talks aimed
at restoring devolution� and as the article �The
North�s Future Depends On Tony Blair�s Bravery�
may not have otherwise crossed your desk, please
find a copy of that article transmitted herewith.
���������������
Also on the topic of possible negotiated
independence, and in advance of this week�s Sedgefield
discussions, please permit me to reiterate a point
raised in my wee �Open Letter� to the Provos published
in The Blanket this past June (with emphases
from the original):
One of the related
thoughts behind looking formally into possible
independence may itself be regarded as revolutionary
although, frankly, it ought not to be: it is better
(a) to take the time to study and test an honest,
workable, and somewhat painful�but mutually
painful�settlement proposal which surely might
be rejected at the polls than either (b) to waste
time trying to con an electorate desperate for
real peace into sanctioning a half-baked, all-things-to-all-men
�solution� which will in fact not work or (c)
to waste more time supinely accepting the abject
failure of democracy, objectively manifested through
the direct rule of Northern Ireland. Distilled
a bit: a workable and possibly acceptable
settlement proposal would be vastly superior to
an acceptable but unworkable scheme or to an undemocratic
period of craven political lassitude.
���������������
Virtually everyone�s job is, of course,
exactly the same: to try to make the boss look
good. All the very best of luck to you in your
own such efforts, particularly if Mr. Blair wisely
elects to stick to his own guns, as described
in the first two paragraphs of the enclosed.
Sincerely,
Paul A. Fitzsimmons
PAF:ms
enclosure
cc
(w/enclosure): Mr. Dermot McCarthy, Secretary
General (by telecopy)
See: (The Blanket,
Belfast)
ATTACHMENT B
-----Original Message-----
From:����� Paul Fitzsimmons [SMTP:pfitzsim@wrightrobinson.com]
Sent:������ 21 July 2004 19:04
To:��������� Alex.Kane
Subject:� As my solicited last to you
Alex:
I�ve pasted my response below
and attached it hereto in a Word file whose superior
formatting renders it much more readable.
Paul
21 July 2004
Dear
Alex:
��������������� Thank you for your note of this
morning.
��������������� Per your invitation to �[c]onvince
[you] otherwise� on independence, my attempt has
to be on bases vastly different from what you�ve
suggested.
��������������� Is independence a ��unionist��
solution? It�s often been referred to as such,
though I�m with you on this one: I don�t so regard
it. What I do strongly feel is that it could be
a quantum leap to a middle ground which might
ultimately be tolerable or even acceptable to
genuine Unionists. David Vance�s �Independence
Day� article�in The Blanket, no less�is extremely substantial
support for that proposition.
��������������� Would Republicans �regard independence
as a British exit�? Well, basically, yes, I think
they would do so. But
that exit would occur only with and through a
formal ratification of Ireland�s
internal border and within the context of a constitutional
situation where written in stone would be how
and when, if ever, that border would change. That point would manifestly be a key aspect
of negotiations on proposed constitutional provisions.
��������������� Let me digress a bit from what
is most important in this overall analysis. In
the course of your note to me, you wrote that
you also �have huge difficulties with how an independent
NI would survive, either politically or economically.�
Those concerns�which I�ve now heard in various
iterations 4,637 times�are perfectly valid, but
they do not go to the question of whether to investigate
independence. Instead, particularly in this post‑GFA
environment, they go only to the question of whether
any given independence proposal should be approved
or rejected.
��������������� Whether to investigate independence
turns most particularly on what is important above all else here (a point you and I have already
touched on in a Slugger
thread). In a recent exchange with a very famous
Republican, I responded:
��������������� �[T]he
German phrase was a bit offensive�? My apologies,
but of course I occasionally use that obviously
pejorative phrase ��ber
alles��in my dealings with all colors and
stripes in Ireland�to make what I think is a key
point: what is truly important here �above all else�? (And, frankly, do those �above all else� desires comport or conflict
with genuine principles which should be overriding?)
�.
��������������� You
say: �I see no solution while the Island remains partitioned, that is a logical conclusion although
I am an emotional Republican as well, I weep at
Mise Eire.� That comment reminded me of a portion
of an article I sent you a couple of days ago:
As noted above[
in that article], Mr. Irvine also tells us:
I cannot see
[major socio-political improvement] happening
while those Six Counties remain either attached
by their poisonous umbilical cord to Britain;
or free to float in their own space.
Responding seriously to that statement, which I have heard
in various forms many times, is difficult to do
without sounding insulting, but here goes: maybe
an important problem here lies in Mr. Irvine�s
vision. Perhaps independence could work but perhaps
Mr. Irvine, in light of his current predilections
and prejudices, is literally unable to see that
potential. As but one indication of his possible
error in this respect, Mr. Irvine refers to my
argument as involving �UDI,� i.e., �unilateral
declaration of independence�; in fact, I have
advocated not any UDI but, instead, independence
resulting from negotiation with London and Dublin
and implemented only with supermajority support.
��������������� [P]lease
don�t just weep for your Eire, indeed our Eire. Instead, please consider now bravely saying something
democratic, and indeed noble, that many others
in your community may be afraid to say themselves:
that you don�t support six-counties independence,
that you don�t think such independence would
work, that you don�t think that it would be broadly
acceptable, BUT that you yourself would accede�perhaps
grudgingly�to that result if an independence plebiscite
received at least 70 percent support in favor.
��������������� Please let me move on at this point
to two things that really are central to this
analysis: Christianity and democracy.
��������������� As I don�t know you personally,
I don�t know whether you are a Christian, but
let me assume for the sake of argument here that
you are, as are many other Unionists. I would
never waste my breath by suggesting to you or
anyone else in Northern Ireland: �As a Christian, you should surrender yourself
politically to the other side in order to resolve
this conflict.� However, I sure as hell hope and
trust that already pellucidly clear is that independence
would mean �surrender��to Dublin or London�would be required from or by neither side. Quite obviously, this is
the main compromise at the heart of this independence
proposal. Since no surrender to �the other side�
would be involved in any respect, two questions
present themselves. Would, in this context, the
other types of sacrifices involved in this independence
approach be such that Christian principles would
urge them to be accepted in order to try to remedy
the main socio‑political problems that have
long scourged your region? Should not now, based
on Christian inclinations and principles, the
logistics of possible independence at least be
formally investigated in this �all else has failed� socio-political situation?
��������������� However, even if you somehow feel
that Christian principles themselves would not
impel such an investigation, how about an investigation
based merely on plain democratic principles? This
aspect of the analysis, particularly from the
Unionist perspective, I find essentially stunning.
In my recent �Open Letter� to the Provos, I�ve proposed that a minimum 70% approval
level be set on an independence plebiscite. Unionists�following,
of course, the gerrymandering of Ireland in the
1920�s�have often rallied around the �self-evident�
truth and wisdom of simple majoritarianism in
government. Against this backdrop, just how on
God�s green earth could a Unionist or Unionism
as a whole�with well over 50% of the vote in your
six counties�possibly conclude that a 70%‑minimum
approval level for an independence proposal could
be anything other than a �democratic� result?
Why in hell would any principled Unionist object,
on any democratic basis, to a fair fight at the
polls concerning a proposal which, if approved,
could only produce a by‑definition democratic
result?
��������������� I�ve got what might be bad news for you personally, so brace yourself:
you yourself are really important to the future
of Northern Ireland. What you say and do could actually make
a difference in the course of Northern Ireland�s
history, as suggested in a 17 July Slugger
posting�which, perhaps due to Mick�s new software,
hasn�t yet made it onto the recent �Utopian� thread�quoted
in part here (and appended in full to this letter):
��������������� [A]s noted in this instant 8 July 2004 �The danger of
utopian dreaming...� thread, you suggested (through
a Newsletter article published earlier
this month) that �wait[ing] another few decades�
for significant improvement in your society might
be necessary. In precisely that light, I asked
you:
[C]an it really
be �better� (i) to decide to forego whatever small
chance for success independence has and to accede
supinely, for decades on end, to socio-political
failure and conflict than (ii) to take a brave
shot at that untested possibility, to find out
for sure through trying (as was done with Sunningdales
Mark I and II) whether success is anywhere near
possible, and at least to fail after trying valiantly?
��������������� Alex,
you�ve accurately informed this group that your
�criticisms of the[ Good Friday] Agreement have
been quoted in the Dail, House of Commons and
the Assembly.� (http://www.sluggerotoole.com/home/archives/001989.asp).
���������������
Maybe--before the GFA does a final �crash
and burn� in September--people in the Dail, the
House of Commons, and beyond would yet do well
to hear a thoughtful response from you on that
italicized question. Frankly, answering that question
honestly and aloud would take more balls
than brains, as the morally correct answer is
obvious and as the GFA political culture seems
to have rendered truth (and perhaps honor as well)
virtually anathema.
��������������� Time is running very short, in
more ways than one, so onward here with still
more truths still more pointed than polite discourse
would typically permit.
��������������� If, entirely contrary to my current
estimations, your Unionism is more important to
you than are the fundamentals of Christianity
and the principles of democracy, I sure as hell
wouldn�t presume to pronounce on the prospects
for your own soul, but Northern Ireland herself may thereby be damned. Relatedly,
these are the first two paragraphs of a note I
wrote on Sunday to Henry McDonald, a journalist
with the guts to challenge �not just the judgment
but also the sanity of the newspaper editors and
pundits who are peddling th[e] illusion� that
the Assembly/Executive might be revived in the
autumn:
��������������� Your �A bridge too far� today was, of
course, dead-on correct. The one qualifying point
I�d raise is this: you write �there is little
or no chance of the restoration of power at Stormont
prior to Tony Blair going to the country in the
spring/summer of 2005,� but the implication is
that the chances might somehow be better thereafter.
Yet Unionists� broadly not wanting �Martin
McGuinness in charge of their children�s education
any more� won�t have changed substantially after
the next British general election. It�ll therefore all be
back to the same thereafter.
�������������� The
subheadline to your story--�The tragedy is
there may never be a point at which the parties
meet�--is exactly the reason I decided, two
decades ago, to write on possible negotiated independence
(articles attached, including my most recent,
an �Open Letter� to the Provos). For whatever the general British �evolution
rather than revolution, atrophy rather than surgery�
philosophy might be worth in other contexts,
it is grossly and gravely inadequate in this one.
Events over these past couple of decades tend
rather strongly to reinforce my conclusion that
Northern Ireland does instead need a �paradigm shift�
for any chance at a genuine settlement. Otherwise,
indeed, �there may never be a point at which the
parties meet.�
��������������� If it�s not already clear, please
allow me to state at this point that, for as sick
as some people may be of hearing from me about
all this, I too am sick of this fight, important
as the �Northern Ireland question� is. I�m sick of stating obvious
truths and so often getting in response blinkered,
erroneous, yet nonetheless hallowed dogmatisms.
I�m sick of the fact that many have given me words
of encouragement but seldom more than private
words, because they won�t raise their heads above
the parapets for fear of what others will think
about some basic socio‑political verities
(David Vance being, to date, the most notable
exception to that rule). I�m sick of people in
Britain and Ireland who�because of laziness or cowardice or otherwise�prefer
the devil they know to the unfallen angel they
don�t know and won�t try to seek out. I�m sick
of those who think that evading difficult questions
is an honorable or morally acceptable practice.
Last November, I wrote similarly:
��������������� On
a train back to D.C. in February 1994�following
a large National Committee on American Foreign
Policy gathering in New York, famously attended by Gerry Adams�another
person who had also attended chanced to sit next
to me. He was, I learned, a lay member of a major
U.S.-based Catholic group tangentially involved
in the Northern Ireland question, and, in the ensuing conversation,
he mentioned his group�s frequent frustration
at being unable to get straight answers to straight
questions posed to various Northern Catholics.
��������������� During the past decade, I�ve often
shared that feeling, though by no means exclusively
because of dealings with members of that one Northern
group. Those years have taught me well that�notwithstanding
stereotypes to the contrary�many Northern Protestants
are no less able to dodge, weave, cover their
ears, and close their eyes when they feel it suits
them to do so. Exceptions in each camp of the
North�s intelligentsia have, in my experience,
been well outnumbered by those who illaudably
follow that general rule.
��������������� Yet,
the costs of such evasions may be high, including
not least their leading astray politicians who
often look to those bright lights and big thinkers
for direction on difficult Northern Ireland issues.
��������������� Alex�after all this haranguing
by me�please have yourself a cup of tea, then
take another pass through this lengthy message,
and finally, after adequate contemplative meditation,
write me a note saying that you�ve decided now
boldly to step up to the plate on this cross-community
heresy or, in the alternative, a note just telling
me frankly to bugger off, so that I can be accordingly
guided. Given the lateness of the hour on this
project, a lukewarm, put-it-on-the-long-finger
response will be worthless and silence worse still.
Also in my email on Sunday to Henry McDonald was
the following:
��������������� I
yet believe the people in Northern Ireland deserve the chance--however small it might
be--to examine, study, and render their verdict upon an
honest and genuine settlement proposal. It might
be that 80 percent or more in Northern Ireland (the ones never videoed rioting) have
enough of a �live and let live� attitude that
they could drag the rest into a stable, workable
future.
��������������� But
if Downing Street is intent on going from a conspicuous GFA
failure straight into officially long-term direct/joint
rule--after I�ve been telling them (Simon McDonald,
here in D.C.; Matthew Rycroft, here in D.C. and
now in No. 10; and Jonathan Powell, via correspondence)
for years and years that they would indeed land
in exactly this position--it seems obvious
to me that I need finally to end these efforts.
Not as self-puffery but as simple fact, I certainly
believe that chances for any sort of �paradigm
shift� in Northern Ireland will be drastically reduced, if not completely
eliminated, after I wrap things up.
��������������� In sum, were you yourself to take
the difficult step of publicly placing democratic
and Christian principles above your own Unionism
by, as I suggested to the �famous Republican�
referenced above,
now bravely saying something democratic, and indeed noble,
that many others in your community may be
afraid to say themselves: that you don�t support
six‑counties independence, that you don�t
think such independence would work, that
you don�t think that it would be broadly acceptable,
BUT
that you yourself would accede�perhaps grudgingly�to
that result if an independence plebiscite received
at least 70 percent support in favor,
your
statement surely would be heard in the House of
Commons, in the D�il, and beyond.
��������������� I hope very much that your decision
on this final petition to you will be one that
you�ll have a right to be proud of for the rest
of your days and indeed thereafter.
��������������� Thanks again. I look forward to
your response.
Best regards,
Paul
Cf. the following
general comments, by American businessman F. Leon Wilson on not stopping the buck, which
have repeated manifestations in recent Northern Ireland history:
How
Not to Solve a Problem
1.
Profess not to have an answer. This releases you from having
an answer.
2.
Say �we must not move too
swiftly.� This avoids the necessity of getting
started.
3.
For every proposal, setup
an opposing proposal, and conclude that the
middle ground (no action/motion) represents
the wisest course of action/motion.
4.
When in a tight place, say anything that the group cannot understand.
5.
Say that the problem cannot
be separated from other problems. Therefore,
no problem can be solved until all other problems
have been solved.
6.
Ask what is meant by the question. When it is clarified, ask
for definitions of each word. When definitions
are given, ask about the structure of the sentence(s).
When it is clarified, hopefully people will
lose interest and/or there will be no time left
for the answer.
7.
Retreat into analogies and discuss them until everyone has forgotten
the original question or problem.
8.
Explain and clarify over and over again what you have already
said.
9.
Say anything, document nothing.
10.
Conclude that you have all
clarified your thinking on the problem even
though no definite conclusions have been reached.
11.
Point out that this is an
age-old problem in which many of the greatest
thinkers have struggled with these same issues
and problems (implying that it does us credit
even to have thought of it).
12.
Be thankful for the problem.
It has stimulated our best thinking and has
therefore contributed to our growth. It/we should
get a medal.
13.
Carry the problem into other
fields and show that it exists everywhere, hence
it has no immediate resolution.
14.
Look slightly embarrassed
when the problem is brought up. Hint that it
is in bad taste or too elementary for mature
consideration. Or too sophisticated for preliminary
consideration, or that any discussion of the
problem is likely to be misunderstood by outsiders
(or the �uninformed�).
15.
Say that we must wait until
some (or other) experts can be consulted.
16.
Intentionally or unintentionally find a face-saving formula
so odd or unusual (�Pickwicking�), that the
overall effect of the words or ideas has no
meaning. However, everyone will accept the formula
because she or he can read into it their own
(individual) interpretation. (This is the highest
art of a good administrator.)
17.
Talk about looking to God
and prayer for the answers, but never mention
or act on the fact that �God helps those who
help themselves.�
18.
Appoint a committee to study the problem or issues.
