At
the moment Belfast is awash with rumours about the
imminent outing of one or more of the many informers
currently operating within Sinn Fein or IRA structures.
Even some of the drones standing outside PSNI stations
demanding an end to political policing have not
escaped the finger of suspicion. Nor is the speculation
confined to critics of the Provisionals. Party and
militia activists alike are giving vent to confusion
and concerns. Sinn Fein, unable to fix the party
brakes has opted to make the horn louder. 'Securocrat
plot' toots out at anybody dumb enough to listen,
of which there are many, evenly spread it would
seem across both Sinn Fein and the media. The party
leader is applying Karl Kraus's secret of the demagogue
which is to make himself as stupid as his audience,
so they believe they are as clever as he.
That
the Provisional movement is extensively penetrated
should come as no surprise. Viewed through the long
war prism it was the logical outcome of a strategy
of attrition, in which the attrition was felt more
by those waging it than those it was intended to
wear down. Activists were reminded that as they
grew older with fewer years left to them, the length
of time they could expect to serve in prison if
captured was increasing by the year. People not
on the run and who lived home lives, with partners
and children, suddenly exposed to the certainty
of losing everything in exchange for a cell found
themselves staring at fences they were no longer
able to jump. The long war strategy saw combatants
emerge from jail after they had served considerable
sentences. If they returned to active service the
chill running through their bones reminded them
of the price to be paid if captured; the choice
was simple - grow old and grey with imprisoned comrades
and wake up alone each morning to the sound of clanging
grills; or come to beside a partner to the laughter
of children. Those IRA internal security doyens,
not working for the British, with decades of experience
observed that the biggest risk factor to the organisation
was ex-prisoners not prepared to return to prison.
For
others such as Sinn Fein activists with a public
profile, the threat of assassination by loyalists
was a constant in their minds. One sure way to retain
their profile minus the risk was to work for the
British. In turn their handlers would ensure that
loyalist death squads were directed elsewhere. It
has been argued by Ed Moloney that the primary reason
for the security services infiltrating loyalist
groups was to ensure that Johnny and his mob did
not target British agents within the Provisional
movement, Britain's main enemy. When such operations
were launched the British would redirect or intervene.
Over
the years the role of ideology as a defence mechanism
against being turned has been steadily eroded. The
abandonment of a republican ideology by the Sticks
was the mainstay of the Provisional critique against
them: they were allegedly riddled with informers
because they had abandoned the ideological immunisation
against touting. Now that Sinn Fein has gone Stick,
the same logic must apply. Options previously ruled
out now become a pragmatic choice. Martin McGuinness
worked as a British minister; Denis Donaldson worked
as a British agent. At the risk of oversimplifying,
the minister's job is to shaft republicanism; that
of the agent is to shaft republicans. While few
outside the ranks of the purists would call McGuinness
a rat on this basis, there is no clear blue ideological
sea between minister and agent.
While
there are patterns, there remains something specific
to the life and circumstances of the individual
'turned' which leads to their predicament and which
rules out providing an effective firewall in advance.
Even when they confess there is no way to be sure
that they are telling the truth; that they are not
merely putting the best possible gloss on their
motives. Denis Donaldson is a case in point. Few
are willing to accept at face value his explanation
that he was compromised at a difficult time in his
life. Given that he lived a lie for at least twenty
years, why should he be believed in the minute it
took him to release his confession? He said exactly
what the Sinn Fein leadership instructed him to,
even to the extent of lying about the fictional
British spy ring at Stormont.
The
political implications of touting are one thing
but there is an additional factor to be considered.
When I look at my own children, I want to see them
pass into my post-existence era with something they
can carry without it burning their hands. There
are things, such as our vocal opposition to power
crazed leaders, that we exercise out of conviction
and which many others howl at. The howlers can pass
on their own hypocrisies to their children and we
can pass on our consistencies. In both cases, whatever
divides us, there exists a much wider chasm separating
critics and howlers from the tout. How fathers and
grandfathers like Denis Donaldson are willing to
allow their offspring to go through life unfairly
carrying the mark of Cain is hard to fathom. Was
he so selfish, cynical and ruthless that he bequeathed
such a legacy to those he brought into the world?
His children and grandchildren are not to blame
and should be viewed as unique individuals. Donaldson's
capable daughter Jane should always be Jane Donaldson
or Jane Kearney, and never the daughter of the self
confessed agent Denis Donaldson no matter what ties
she may wish to retain with him. He remains her
father. And as Camus once observed, when forced
to choose between the ideal no matter how beautiful
and those we love, we opt for those we love. It
is simply untenable to allow a diminution of respect
for Donaldson's family to take hold. Those who love
him remain as decent as anyone else in these communities.
Provisionalism
is now being haunted by a spooky spectre. What blossomed
in spring has now become autumn fruit, as poisonous
as it is bountiful.
