The key questions that arise from
the recent all-Ireland European election are not to
do with whether or not Sinn Fein has become an unstoppable
vote-gathering machine which one day soon will relentlessly
propel Gerry Adams into the Taoiseachs office
in Government Buildings, but conversely whether the
Sinn Fein steamroller is beginning to run out of steam
in the North, why this is happening and what impact
it could have on SF's fortunes in the South.
Lost in the brouhaha surrounding
the election of two Sinn Fein MEPs and overlooked
by media commentators made dizzy by the spin of the
partys media handlers, is a simple fact. The
European election result in the North was the worst
for Sinn Fein in five years and is only 1700 or so
votes better than the result the party scored in the
1998 Assembly elections, just after the Good Friday
Agreement was signed and at the start of Sinn Feins
post-peace process electoral triumphs. An analysis
of the SF vote since then shows a pattern that must
be depressingly familiar to Sinn Fein managers who
were at the helm when the party first entered electoral
politics in the wake of the 1981 hunger strikes. If
one was to graph Sinn Feins election performances
in the 1980s the result would be a bell-shaped
curve reflecting initial success, caused both by anger
at the hunger strike deaths and superb mobilisation
of the Provo base, which peaked with Adamss
election to Westminster in 1983 and then started to
fall off, settling at a level somewhere between the
best and the worst results.
The
same pattern, albeit at a higher plane thanks to the
IRAs ceasefires and the peace process, is detectable
since 1998. In that years Assembly election,
Sinn Fein won 142,858 votes; it peaked three years
later with the election of four SF MPs in the
2001 Westminster poll at 175,392 votes but has declined
in the subsequent two elections, the last of which
saw Bairbre de Brun win a seat to Strasbourg but Sinn
Feins vote fall to 144,541. The image in the
media is of a Sinn Fein vote that arches ever upwards;
the reality is more complicated.
Hand
in hand with this has been a steady but relentless
decline in the SDLP vote. In 1998 the SDLP won 177,963
votes and was comfortably ahead of SF. Last week the
party, minus John Hume, slumped to 87,559, nearly
57,000 votes behind Sinn Fein.
The
temptation, to which so many reporters succumb, is
to present this as being somewhow about militant Republicanism
supplanting constitutional Nationalism. To be sure
there is no doubt that Sinn Feins growth has
come in large part from the SDLPs decline but
since there are now next to no ideological distinctions
between the two parties this is a phenomenon with
little political significance; the important differentiating
factors these days are more to do with age, energy,
style, marketing and money than attitudes towards
the British presence and the Unionists. It is as if
Tweeledum was to steal Tweedledees lollipop;
would anyone care or even notice?
A
much clearer and revealing explanation of Sinn Fein
and SDLP voting patterns can be got by examining the
total Nationalist vote and placing its performance
in a recent historical context.
Once
that is done it becomes clear that Nationalism's two
most impressive performances came in the 1998 Assembly
election, when a total of 320,821 Nationalists turned
out and in the 2001 Westminster poll when 345,257
voted.
A
tentative but credible explanation for these two results
goes as follows: Nationalists come out to vote in
large numbers when there is a chance of their representatives
grabbing a slice of power at Stormont, as in the 1998
poll, or when there is a chance to take seats away
from Unionists, as in the 2001 election.
Contrast
those two elections with the the 2003 Assembly election,
to a set of suspended institutions with little if
no prospect of exercising power, when 280,305 Nationalists
voted or the 2004 European election when only 232,100
nationalists voted in an election most people believed
was in the DUP bag. Between 1998 and 2004 the total
Nationalist vote has declined by a third.
The
conclusion is inescapable: Nationalists are more likely
to vote when there is an opportunity to take a kick
at the Unionists, either by taking from them a seat
or two or obliging Unionists to accept Nationalists
sitting with them around the cabinet table as equals.
So
what are the lessons for Sinn Fein in all this? The
next big electoral test will come at next years
Westminster poll but this time round the chance that
Sinn Fein can steal seats from Unionists, like they
did in Fermanagh-South Tyrone or West Tyrone in 2001,
will be minimal. If SF gain this time it will at the
expense of the SDLP, in South Down, Foyle and Newry-Armagh.
They will probably succeed but there is not much incentive
there for the overall Sinn Fein vote to rise; more
likely that demoralised SDLP'ers will stay at home.
The
best set of circumstances for Sinn Feins vote
to rise is when Nationalism as a whole sees a chance
to exercise power at Stormont. If there is a lesson
for Gerry Adams and his advisers in the 2004 election
it is to get back into Stormont, even if that means
having to satisfy the DUPs demands to wind up
the IRA. Otherwise the decline in the partys
vote will just continue and that will inevitably impact
adversely on the party's image as a growing force
in the South.
In
the 1980's, IRA violence was largely responsible for
ending Sinn Fein's then cycle of election successes;
if the Provos continue to refuse to decommission the
IRA then they run a great risk of the same thing happening
again. Far from being an unmitigated triumph for Sinn
Fein, it would be more accurate to view the 2004 election
as a yellow card from the Nationalist voter.
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