Over the past three decades the British establishment
expended considerable time and treasure depicting
the war in the north of Ireland as a sectarian
conflict between catholic and protestant, rather
than a national liberation struggle between the
British state and the IRA. There was a time when
many republicans would have scoffed at such a
suggestion and dismissed it as classic black propaganda,
which sought to absolve the British state of any
role in the conflict. However, the gradual implementation
of the Belfast Agreement, the latest manifestation
of which was the March 26th encounter between
Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams, has compelled many
republicans to reconsider what actually motivated
and sustained the PIRA armed struggle.
For
the past thirty years, the creation of a power-sharing
administration was John Hume's political blueprint
for the north. If the Belfast Agreement represented
political vindication for any party it was the
SDLP. Yet, the paradox of the peace process is
that despite this political vindication and ideological
triumph, the SDLP has been electorally obliterated
by Sinn Fein. An objective and honest assessment
of the reasons behind this political development
provides little succour for radical republicans.
The
conventional peace process narrative depicts the
Adams-McGuinness leadership coaxing its community
- with considerable deft and skill - away from
the path of armed struggle and the demand for
total independence and down the road of reform
within the six-county state. But is this narrative
an accurate representation of recent political
developments? Is it accurate to depict the northern
catholic community as pro-republican? And how
much persuasion and coaxing was actually required
to garner support for a return to Stormont?
The
PIRA armed struggle was sustained not by nationalist
resentment at the British state presence but rather
by widespread resentment at British-administered
structural inequality within the northern state.
Once a process to address exisitng structural
discrimination was underway, support for armed
struggle evaporated. Yes, the Belfast Agreement
unquestionably consolidated British sovereignty
over the north. But this reality has not been
accompanied by a clammer for a resumption of armed
struggle to remove British political interference.
Evidently, the removal of structural discrimination
within the six-county state represented the apex
of northern nationalist aspirations.
Should
we be surprised by this? A close examination of
history indicates that we should not. Eamon McCann
has correctly pointed to the fact that before
and since partition the northern catholic community
has shown little appetite for radical republicanism.
In support of this thesis McCann cites the 1918
victory of Joe Devlin over DeValera in West Belfast
and the fact that West Belfast did not elect a
republican MP until 1983 [1].
Is
the recent Sinn Fein upsurge evidence of a genuine
republican advance? No, a cursory reading of the
Belfast Agreement illustrates that there is no
correlation between the enlarged Sinn Fein vote
and the realisation of republican ideals. During
the past decade Sinn Fein slayed its sacred republican
cows, terminated the armed struggle, decommissioned
its military wing and appropriated and remarketed
the SDLP's political agenda with renewed vigour.
Nor does the enlarged Sinn Fein vote represent
an electoral endorsement of republicanism. If
anything it is an endorsement of the reformist
middle-ground previously occupied by the SDLP
but now colonised by Sinn Fein.
The
Adams-McGuinness leadership's realignment of the
provisional movement with the reformist political
demands of its northern nationalist hinterland
undoubtedly triggered recent electoral gains.
This is indisputable. But was this realignement
provoked by the reality of a ongoing military
stalemate? Or was the Adams-McGuinness leadership,
since the early 1980s, laying the groundwork for
the provisional movement's eventual acceptance
of an internal settlement?
The
overall strategic orientation of the Adams-McGuinness
leadership between 1981 and 1998 was characterised
by an incremental accomodation with the British
state in Ireland. By the late 1970s Adams and
McGuinness had yet to secure sufficient control
over the provisional movement. Any suggestion
of a dilution of traditional PIRA demands or tactics
at that time would have provoked internal instability
and threatened their leadership. However, in November
1981 Sinn Fein decided to contest northern local
elections on an abstentionist ticket. In April
1982 Sinn Fein fielded candidates in the election
to Jim Prior's Stormont Assembly and won five
seats on an abstentionist ticket. Three years
later Sinn Fein accepted its seats in local council
throughout the north. In 1986 Sinn Fein recognised
the legitimacy of Leinster House. All of these
political signposts foretold the 1998 return to
Stormont and, to quote Francie Molloy, the decision
"to administer British rule in Ireland for
the foreseeable future" [2].
When viewed within this context, the strategic
drift towards an internal settlement was incremental
and to some extent all too predictable. However,
the timing of delivery ultimately depended upon
Adams and McGuinness securing the sufficient appointment
of loyal and trusted personnel throughout the
organisation and the avoidance of a devastating
split.
The
PIRA armed campaign eventually culminated with
the constitutional entrenchment of British sovereignty,
the creation of a power-sharing executive with
minimalist cross-border bodies, and a commitment
to remove structural inequalities within the northern
state. As John Hume reminded us last week, all
of this was available more than twenty years ago.
This raises profound moral and political questions,
particularly if the Adams-McGuinness leadership
was, by the mid-to late 1980s, prepared to settle
for such an arrangement but lacked the organisational
dominance to secure internal support; and in its
absence chose to continue a low-intensity campaign
until the internal dynamic within the organisation
had altered favourably, the delivery of which
British intelligence played no small part.
As
Ed Moloney pointed out:
