Over
recent weeks the usual coterie of revisionists have
been out peddling their anti-republican invective
during the debates concerning Easter 1916. As is
customary, the mainstream media has granted their
dinner-table history lectures a disproportionate
amount of air and column space. Thus, we have been
deluged with disparaging depictions of the Rising
as a nihilistic blood sacrifice which lacked a democratic
mandate and as an ultimately counterproductive event
in that just as much could have been achieved had
constitutional nationalism been granted sufficient
breathing space. It is necessary to counter these
attempts at revising the Rising.
Let us firstly deal with the question of the so-called
blood sacrifice. Many revisionists point to extracts
from Pearse's writings to support the blood sacrifice
thesis. Yes, without doubt, Pearse's use of language
was often extreme, but also - and this should not
be overlooked - typical of the age. Historically,
leaders of advanced nationalist movements have regularly
resorted to political hyperbole. "The tree
of liberty must continually be watered with the
blood of martyrs and the blood of tyrants".
This archetypal Pearseian phrase was in fact written
by Thomas Jefferson. So are we to take it that the
American war of independence was a blood sacrifice?
One cannot truly appreciate the Rising unless it
is placed within its proper international and historical
context. To the ill-informed the Rising might appear
as a historical grand gesture or yet another theatrical
assertion in arms of republican aspirations. However,
the Rising was anything but. In fact it represented
the realisation of a coherent revolutionary strategy
that was far removed from the revisionist depiction
of a mindless blood sacrifice.
Any assessment of the Rising must take into consideration
the 18-month-long protracted negotiations which
the 1916 leaders conducted with the German general
staff and admiralty from mid-1914 onwards. These
negotiations resulted in the Rising coinciding with
a massive German offensive on the western front
at Verdun. The 1916 leaders fervently hoped the
IRA would hold out for three days on Easter Week,
thus satisfying the requirement that would enable
a victorious Germany to fulfill its promise to give
Ireland a hearing at the post-war peace conference
as an independent belligerent nation. We now know
the British war cabinet actually considered the
possibility of suing for peace in the spring of
1916, when a German victory, or the emergence of
a situation in which Germany could demand satisfactory
peace terms for an end to hostilities, seemed a
distinct probability. It was at this post-war peace
conference that the 1916 leaders fervently hoped
that Irish national aspirations would be realised.
Unfortunately, history dictated otherwise. But as
has been shown, the strategic approach employed
by the 1916 leaders can only be appreciated within
a broad international context. And contrary to the
ahistorical assertions of the anti-republican revisionists,
the Rising was anything but a theatrical exercise
in political hari-kari. Indeed, as the eminent historian
Eoin Neeson has pointed out, the lasting shibboleth
of "the blood sacrifice" is "one
of the most effective and enduring examples of black
propaganda this country has been subject in recent
times".
Revisionists also highlight the absence of a democratic
mandate for armed insurrection. This is indisputable.
But they fail to qualify this by acknowledging that
Ireland was not a democracy in 1916. The Act of
Union, designed to permanently frustrate Irish democracy,
was itself contrived without a democratic mandate
and British rule in Ireland had no democratic mandate.
Furthermore, only half the population was entitled
to elect representatives to a foreign parliament
in 1916. The Proclamation sought to remedy this
democratic deficit by guaranteeing universal suffrage
to a native Irish parliament. Indeed the sovereignty
of the Westminster parliament over Irish affairs
was the precise reasons why the insurgents were
fighting. Having correctly assessed British intentions,
the leaders of 1916 sought a radical alteration
of Irish national perspectives by acting first and
seeking a retrospective mandate later. The resort
to armed force was derived from the fact that British
rule has no moral authority in Ireland and that
Irish national demands would always fall victim
to British interests and subversion. Kevin Myers
may bemoan the fact that few of the 1916 leaders
ever stood for election. But the fact is no Irish
separatist sought to take seats in a British parliament,
as none sought to lend legitimacy to a body they
fervently sought to overthrow. What is indisputable
is that the Easter insurgents received a retrospective
mandate in the 1918 when Sinn Fein stood for election
on the principles of the 1916 Proclamation.
Revisionists also contend that just as much could
have been achieved by constitutional nationalism
by 1921 without any recourse to physical force.
They argue that a twenty-six county Home Rule entity
could have evolved into an independent Irish state.
However, posing the question in this manner simply
confuses the issue. The 1916 rebels did not wish
to hasten Home Rule for the twenty-six counties.
They fought for an all-island Irish Republic, something
diametrically opposed to Home Rule. Home Rule sought
to co-opt the Irish urban and rural bourgeoisie
in the administration of Irish affairs within the
Empire. Whereas the 1916 leaders sought a democratic
all-island socialist Republic and a radical break
with empire. A partitioned Ireland may have been
the historical outcome by 1921, but this cannot
detract from the 1916 leaders' total opposition
to partition, as outlined by Pearse in his 1915
essay Why We Want Recruits.
Anti-republican
revisionists may attempt to disparage and dilute
the visionary ideals of the Easter rebels who fought
and died for an independent, sovereign, all-island,
socialist Republic. However, under no circumstances
should we allow their tawdry version of Irish history
to stand unanswered.
